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parallel importation has been being one of the most controversial issues under international 
intellectual property laws. Consequently, the main purposes of this article is to assure that 
intellectual property law—in particular, the exhaustion doctrine—is best fit to deal with the issue 
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for the harmonization goal through examining the theoretical arguments and observing legal 
experience in the global community.                                                                   
                                       © 2012 Chung-Lun Shen .Published by JICLT. All rights reserved.  
 
I. Introduction 
The interaction between the exhaustion of intellectual property rights and the parallel importation has been one 
of the most controversial issues under international intellectual property laws.  This issue arouses the strained 
conflicting positions in both the protection of intellectual property rights and the maintenance of international 
free trade.  Since each country in the global community has faced discrepant political, economic and social 
backgrounds, the divergent exhaustion doctrine is preferred around the global community—basically, while the 
developing countries are dedicated to expanding the scope of the exhaustion doctrine, the developed countries 
tend to stick to more protection on intellectual property rights.   The internationally undecided status in the 
adoption of the exhaustion doctrine also led to the fact that the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the 
WIPO(World Intellectual property Organization) gave up proposing the uniform exhaustion doctrine, leaving the 
member states absolute discretion in deciding the scope of the exhaustion doctrine.   
 
Nonetheless, there are two main potential defects in the attitude held by the WTO and the WIPO.  One is 
reflected in the worry about whether the national decision of the exhaustion doctrine is exactly based on 
reconciling the protection of intellectual property rights and the maintenance of international free trade, some 
other factors irrelevant to intellectual property laws being excluded in the decision of the exhaustion doctrine.  If 
the exhaustion doctrine is used to achieve the policy goals outside of intellectual property laws, the protection of 
intellectual property rights would be excessively developed. 
 
Another concern involves the possibility that some developed countries with strong bargaining power would 
force the developing countries to adopt the exhaustion doctrine favourable to the fulfilment of the specific 
economic policy of the developed countries through bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations.  This potential 
result would break down the original balance mechanism established by the exhaustion doctrine between the two 
conflicting interests of intellectual property rights and international free trade, and distort international free trade. 
 
In view of the potential defects in the international undecided attitude about the exhaustion doctrine and the 
consequential influence, in this author’s view, it is necessary to establish a globally harmonized exhaustion 
doctrine in the WTO or WIPO to implicate the optimal interest balance between intellectual property rights and  
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international free trade.  Consequently,  the main purposes of this article is  to assure that intellectual property 
law—in particular, the exhaustion doctrine—is the optimal legal approach to deal with the issue of the conflict 
between intellectual property rights and international free trade.  Meanwhile, this article is also to determine that 
the international exhaustion doctrine is the optimal legal model for the harmonization goal by examining the 
theoretical arguments and observing legal experience in the global community. 
  
This article is divided into five sections.  The first section is the introduction for this article. The second 
mainly indicates the two conflicting interests between the protection of intellectual property rights and the 
maintenance of international free trade that are reflected in the cases of parallel importation.  Another core 
content of section two (2) is to determine whether intellectual property laws (the exhaustion doctrine) are best fit 
to deal with the issue of parallel importation to balance the interest consideration under both intellectual property 
rights and international free trade.   
 
Section 3 concentrates on the theoretical and academic debates over the application of the international 
exhaustion doctrine on the issue of parallel importation.  There are two parts in the debates—while one is based 
on the policy consideration, the other is according to the economic analysis.  Regarding the policy and economic 
arguments, this chapter bifurcates the positions into the two groups—one for the international exhaustion 
doctrine and the other against the doctrine.  Section 4 contains the arguments supporting   the international 
exhaustion doctrine in  section three,. The dissertation indicates, in terms of laws and international trade 
practices, the weak theoretical basis and misconception about the gist of intellectual property laws on the 
arguments against the international exhaustion doctrine.  In addition, from the angle of the observation of legal 
experience in the global community, it is found that the harmonized international exhaustion doctrine would not 
bring about the unbearable impact in the global community.  Consequently, the international exhaustion doctrine 
is concluded as an optimal legal model.  Moreover, this article also probes into the issues about the application of 
the international exhaustion doctrine to determine whether the international exhaustion doctrine should be 
indiscriminately applied to various intellectual property rights, re-importation, and different goods embodied 
with intellectual property rights.  Section five develops the conclusion of this article. 
2. Intellectual Property Rights and International Free Trade—The Interests Conflicting in 
Terms of Parallel Import and the Legal Approach for Resolution 
2.1 The Exclusive Rights against Distribution of Goods under Intellectual Property Laws 
The exclusive right under intellectual property rights against the distribution of goods is the focus of the cases of 
parallel imports.  The distribution right, through legislation or legal interpretation, under patent law, trademark 
law, copyright law, is a potential threat to parallel imports. 
2.1.1 Patent Law 
The legislative purpose of patent law is mainly to provide inventors with a limited monopoly and sufficient 
incentives to engage in creating or inventing new technologies benefiting people around the country.1  Generally 
speaking, the protection of patent law, in terms of an international comparative perspective, reaches out to 
infringement during manufacture and infringement after manufacture.2  Infringement during manufacture is the  
                                                          
1
 Clause 8 of Section 8, Article I of the Constitution of the United States: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries;” ; See also Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases and Materials on Patent Law § 1.5[a][1] (3d ed. 2009) [ hereinafter 
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW]; F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLE OF PATENT LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 66-67 
(4th ed. 2008) [ hereinafter F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PATENT LAW]; ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 23 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; W.R. CORNISH, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS ¶¶ 3-38 to -48 (5th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. 
2
 See CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ¶¶ 6-09 to -20. 
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illegal copy or imitation of the patented products or the patented invention process.3 Infringement after 
manufacture occurs when patented products or products manufactured under a patented invention process, 
regardless of the illegal copies or authorized ones, are sold, offered to sell, or imported without patentee’s 
consent.4  From the angle of infringement after manufacture, patent law creates an exclusive right related to the 
marketing of the patented products or the products under patented process, that is, the patentee has an exclusive 
right to control the distribution of goods in the local market, even blocking goods from coming into the local 
market from the foreign countries. 
2.1.2. Trademark Law 
Traditionally, trademark law is used to protect the first user of trademark in commerce from likelihood of 
confusion of the two marks occurring when the subsequent users employ the same or similar trademark.5  The 
protection reflects consideration of two interests—consumer’s interest and trademark owner’s interest.6   On 
consumer’s interest, the traditional protection of trademark serves a function of source indicator, assisting 
consumers in finding the accurate commercial commodities by the evaluation of trademark in mind under a low 
search cost.7  The consideration of trademark owner’s interest drives a guarantee of product quality because 
trademark law awards the trademark owner sufficient incentive to maintain or improve the qualities of the 
commodities.8  
 
Lately, trademark protection has evolved to cover the economic value of a trademark being formed through 
the trademark owner’s investment in developing commodities and creating goodwill.9  As a result, the dilution of 
the reputed trademark becomes a kind of infringement under trademark law. 10 
 
                                                          
3
 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses... any 
patented invention, within the United States…during the term of the Patent therefor, infringes the patent.”); See also Article 
25 of Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, 1976 Q.J. (L401) 1-28 [hereinafter the Proposed 
Community Patent Convention] (The convention is proposed  for establishment of community patent and harmonization of 
patent law within the European Economic Community and amended in 1989, but never ratified by all  Member States. See 
Hanns Ullrich, Patent Protection in Europe: Integrating Europe into the Community or the Community into Europe?, 8 EUR. 
L.J. 437-38 (2002).); Article 7 of Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, Council document 7119/04, 8 
March 2004[hereinafter Compact 2004]; Article 28 of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter the WTO Agreement], Annex 
1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter the TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
4
 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority…offers to sell, or 
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term 
of the patented therefore, infringes the patent.”); See also Article25 of the Proposed Community Patent Convention; Article 
28 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
5
 See MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 559; Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961);  AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1979). 
6
 See TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 21-24 (1994) [hereinafter HIEBERT, PARALLEL 
IMPORTATION]. 
7
 See JEREMY PHILLIPS, TRADE MARK LAW ¶¶ 2.24  to .29 (2003); CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, ¶ 15-24.  
See also WILLIAM  M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY LAW 166-68 
(2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] (“The benefits of trademarks in lowering consumer 
search costs presuppose legal protection….”) 
8
 See HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION, supra note 6, at 3-6. 
9
 The dilution theory of trademark is introduced to the United States by Professor Frank I. Schechter through his classic 
article “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection”.  See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 
40 HARV. L. REV.813 (1927).   Regarding the development of the dilution theory under trademark law, see TONY MARTINO, 
TRADEMARK DILUTION (1996). 
10
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1999); Article 5(2) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate 
the laws of the Members States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 Q.J. (L040) 1-7 [hereinafter E.C. Trademark Directive]; 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Wagamama Ltd. v. City Cenre Restaurant, [1995] F.S.R. 713 (U.K. Case); Baywatch Prod. Co. Ltd. v. Home 
Video Channel, [1997] F.S.R. 22.   
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The use of trademark in commerce is an important factor to reserve rights in trademark.11  For the same 
reason, infringement under trademark law is rested on the use of trademark in commerce.  The use of trademark 
for infringement under trademark law, in terms of a global comparative perspective, consists of affixing 
trademark to the package of goods, trading goods under trademark, importing or exporting goods under 
trademark and advertising with trademark.12  Among the use types of infringement, trading goods and the 
imports or exports of goods are related to the distribution of the goods.  Consequently, the trademark owner has 
the exclusive right to block the distribution of the goods, provided that the junior’s trademark use on trading, 
imports, or exports constitutes the likelihood of confusion or dilution of the senior’s trademark. 
2.1.3 Copyright Law 
Unlike patent law and trademark law, under which an exclusive right against the distribution of the goods is 
created through interpreting the prohibition of sales or imports, the distribution right under copyright law, in 
terms of a global comparative perspective, directly gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to control the 
first public distribution of the copyrighted works.13  The infringement of the distribution right can occur without 
illegally reproducing the copyrighted works.14  From this, the copyright owner can use the distribution right to 
prevent the movement of goods in the market, if anyone put the copies of the copyrighted work into market for 
the first distribution without authorization. 
2.2   The Globally Harmonized Free Trade Principle 
The globally accepted free trade principle is driving the international free movement of goods and the global 
prosperous economy.  It is also a focus in the cases of parallel imports if the free trade principle will be applied 
to parallel imports, and further protects parallel imports from the protection of the distribution right under 
intellectual property laws.  It is important to affirm the free trade principle by observing the related provisions of 
the World Trade Organization, the European Union, and some free trade areas. 
2.2.1 The World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization with global common agreements binding 
the governments of Members to establish the environment of international free trade and solve transnational 
trade disputes.  It is the successor of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).  The establishment of 
WTO is the result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiation of the GATT in 1994.15 According to the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement), the agreements 
binding Members consist of the GATT 1994 and all agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.16  Among the 
package of agreements, the GATT 1994, generally, incorporates the GATT 1947 and terminates the application 
of the GATT 1947.17 
 
The GATT has been playing an important role in promoting international free trade by reducing the trade 
barriers since it was made.  When the character of the international organization is transiting to the WTO, 
undoubtedly the WTO takes the responsibility to achieve the goal of international free trade.   The free trade  
 
 
                                                          
11
 See 15 U.SC. §§ 1115(b)(2), 1127 (1999) (Abandonment of Trademark); E.C. Trademark Directive, supra note 10, Article 
10-12 (Non-Use of Trademark). 
12
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124-25 (1999); E.C. Trademark Directive, supra note 10, Article 5. 
13
 See  17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002); Article 4 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 Q.J. (L167) 
10-19 [hereinafter E.C. Copyright Directive]. 
14
 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.13 (4th ed. 2005). 
15
 See MITSUO MATSUSHITA  ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 5-6 (2003) [hereinafter MITSUO MATSUSHITA  ET AL., 
THE WTO]. 
16
  See id. at 7-8. 
17
  Id. at 9. 
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principle of the WTO is reflected in Article XI (1) (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) of the 
GATT 1994,18 and is also used to form the boundary of intellectual property protection under Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) in view of the possible conflict 
between the safeguard of free trade and the protection of intellectual property rights.19 
2.2.2 The European Union 
The European Union is the most important customs union in the world.20   The European Union originates from 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.  Then, in order to establish a customs union within the 
six founding countries of ECSC (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) through the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (the Treaty of Rome) in 1957, the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was formed.  In 1992, according to Treaty on European Union (the Masstricht Treaty), the 
EEC is renamed into the European Community (EC), and becomes part of the EU. 
 
As a customs union, the paramount goal of the EU is to establish an internal common market within the 
territory of the EU.  To achieve the goal, neither tariff nor other trade barriers between Member States are 
necessary.  Compared with the free trade principle under the WTO to establish the international trade 
competitive environment, the free trade principle under the EU has more emphasis on the free movement of 
goods in the internal common market.21  This is reflected in the requirement of elimination of custom duties and 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions between Member States according to the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community amended and renumbered by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the Nice Treaty of 2001 and the 
Lisbon Treaty of 2007 [hereinafter the European Community Treaty].22 
2.3 The Free Trade Areas 
A free trade area is formed by free trade agreements of a group of countries.  Within the free trade area, 
according to the free trade agreements, member states are bound to reduce or eliminate the trade barriers among 
themselves to create a region of free trade.  However, different from the customs union, the purpose of a free 
trade area is not to establish a common market.  The member states of a free trade area have the right to employ 
tariffs or impose custom duties against other states.  Usually, the establishment of a free trade area might be the 
first step to form a customs union. 
 
The free trade principle is driven throughout the trades within the free trade area because the environment of 
no custom duty and trade barrier expects to be built.  This is reflected in the free trade agreements of the current 
free trade areas.23 
                                                          
18
 Article XI (1) of  General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (1994) [hereinafter the GATT 1994]: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export license or other measures shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party 
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting  party or on the exportation or sale 
of export of any product destined for the territory of  any other contracting party. 
19
 See the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at preamble (“…Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international 
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to 
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barrier to legitimate 
trade…”) 
20
 Regarding the history of the European Union [hereinafter the EU], see RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 1-30 (3rd 
ed. 1999).  
21
 See Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law 
Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 607, 618  (1998) [hereinafter Abbott, First Report ]. 
22
 See Article 25, 28, 29 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2001).  See also Article 30, 34, 35 of 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2010/C 83/01, 30 March, 2010) 
[hereinafter the European Community Treaty]. 
23
 See, e.g.,  Article 102(a), 301, 302, 309 of North America Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter the NAFTA] (The parties of 
the agreement are the United States, Canada and Mexico);  Article 10, 11, 12 of Agreement on the European Economic Area 
[hereinafter the EEA Agreement] (Parties of the agreement include 3 members of the European Free Trade Association 
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2.3 Parallel Imports and Ignition of the Interest Conflict 
Parallel imports are a distinctive kind of trades.  Traditionally, parallel imports are often connected with gray 
markets, and are rarely distinguished from gray markets.  It is necessary to ascertain the definition and the scope 
of parallel import and the relation of parallel imports with gray markets before discussing the issue of parallel 
imports.   
 
Although the parallel import is not different from the ordinary import in the international trade practice, its 
implication under law is complicated.  It leads to a possible conflict between intellectual property rights and free 
trade.  The measurement of the two conflicting interests will be a basis for selecting the legal approach to resolve 
the issue of parallel imports. 
2.3. 1. Parallel Imports and Gray Markets 
Both parallel imports and gray markets indicate the same phenomenon of international trade—unauthorized 
imports, though it seems that the two terms are different in terms of semantics.24   Usually, for the efficient 
distribution of products, especially in the international marketing, the manufacturer may arrange the hierarchical 
distribution channels to market its products by establishing the distribution agents or cooperating with other 
distributors not affiliated with the manufacturer.  The unauthorized imports occur when products are imported to 
the country of the manufacturer through the marketing channels other than the designated ones, or when the 
import of products is beyond the marketing schedule, that is, the import is not the manufacturer’s intention.  
Most scholars, interpreting the parallel import or the gray market, tend to connect the unauthorized imports with 
intellectual property rights to emphasize the strained tension existing between international trade and intellectual 
property rights,25 although, theoretically, there is some possibility that the authorized imports occur without any 
relation to intellectual property rights.  The manufacturer as an owner of patent, trademark or copyright can 
control the movement of its products.  Consequently, the problem of parallel imports or the gray markets will 
create an issue of whether the owner of intellectual property rights can block the unauthorized import under law.  
According to the comparative law perspective, judiciary cases and case law regarding parallel imports or gray  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
[hereinafter the EFTA]—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, the European Community and 25 other European Countries; 
Articles 4 and 5 of Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(Members of Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam); Protocol  to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN free Trade Area (AFTA). 
24
 See THOMAS HAYS, PARALLEL IMPORTATION UNDER EUROPEAN UNION LAW ¶ 1.01 (2004) [hereinafter HAYS, PARALLEL 
IMPORTATION]; Marshall Leaffer, Parallel Importation and the Gray Market in the United States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW & POLICY (Volume 1) 351 (Huge C. Hansen ed., 1996) [hereinafter Leaffer, Gary Market].  See also WARWICK A. 
ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 1 (1993) (“[T]he [parallel] imports may be described as being imported in ‘parallel’ to the 
authorised distribution network”) (alteration in original) (note omitted). 
25
 See, e.g., Kerrin M. Vautier, Economic  Consideration on Parallel Imports, in PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA 1-11 
(Christopher Heath ed., 2004) [hereinafter Vautier, Economic Consideration]; HAYS, PARALLEL IMPORTATION,  supra note 24;  
W. R. Cornish, The Free Movement of Goods I: Pharmaceutical, Patent and Parallel Trade, in PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN LAW 11-24 ( Richard Goldberg & Julian Lonbay eds., 2000) [hereinafter Cornish, Parallel 
Trade]; Nacy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A Contractual Approach to the Gray Market, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (1999); 
Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel Imports through Intellectual Property, 30 IIC 495 (1999) [hereinafter 
Jehoram, Parallel Imports]; Abbott, First Reports, supra note 21; Marshall Leaffer, Gray Market, supra note 24; HIEBERT, 
PARALLEL IMPORTATION, supra note 6; ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS, supra note 24; SETH E. LIPNER, THE LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GARY MARKET GOODS (1990) [hereinafter LIPNER, GARY MARKET GOODS]. 
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markets run the same track with the academic interpretation to resolve the entanglement between unauthorized 
imports and intellectual property rights.26 
 
Generally speaking, there are three elements forming parallel imports or gray market.  The first element is 
that products are imported from a foreign market to the native market of the manufacturer for competition.  The 
second one rests on the authorization of the owner of intellectual property rights.  In other words, the products 
(inventions, commodities affixed with trademark, or copyright works) are imported without consent of the 
manufacturer (patentee, trademark owner or copyright owner) because the non-designated distributors usually 
have no license for patented products, trademarked commodities and copyrighted works from the manufacturer.  
The source of parallel imports or gray markets may come from the licensed distributor by the licensee’s breach 
of the licensing agreement to import the products into the market of the manufacturer.  Additionally, it is 
possible for unlicensed distributors or the third parties to purchase the products from the licensee, and then 
import them into the native market. 
 
The final element for parallel imports or gray markets requires that the products imported from a foreign 
market must be genuine, 27and be under the same invention, brand or copyright work as the original products in 
the native market.  If the products are counterfeit or made through imitation, the manufacturer can prevent them 
from direct import according to intellectual property laws.  This situation is called “black market”.  Nevertheless, 
the reason that “gray market” is “gray” is that the genuine products never violate intellectual property laws, but 
the unauthorized import sparks a dispute about whether the import infringes in the distribution right under 
intellectual property laws.  As a result, this uncertainty is within the “gray” zone under law. 
  
Further, a query is produced for the scope of parallel import: whether the re-importing of the products 
may be thought of or treated as the parallel import under law. Unlike the products of parallel import made in 
foreign countries, the products re-imported are manufactured in the market of the manufacturer, and exported 
into foreign markets according to the marketing scheme.  However, as the products of parallel import, the re-
imported products are imported into the native market.  Although judiciary cases under law and case law, 
according to the comparative law perspective, seem not to put much emphasis on the issue,28 the academic 
comments are divided into two different positions—one supporting no distinction between the two,29 and the 
other expressing a different treatment for the two.30  In this author’s opinion, the core of parallel import or gray 
market focuses on the unauthorized import and the control of intellectual property rights over the import.  The 
manufacture place of the genuine products is not a sufficient ground to make the re-import stay out of the scope 
of the parallel import and have different treatment under the law. 
  
Finally, few academic comments and judicial cases mention the relation between parallel imports and 
gray markets.31  Parallel imports and gray markets are often given the same meaning.  In this author’s opinion,  
                                                          
26
 Regarding the U.S. cases, see generally Quality King Distribs., Inc.  v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc. 523 U.S. 135 (1998); K-
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890).  As to the European Union 
[hereinafter the E.U.], see ECJ Case 355/96, Silhouette International Schimied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1998] E.C.R. I-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998) [hereinafter Silhouette v. Hartlauer]; ECJ 
Joint Cases 267/95 and 268/95, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Primecrown and Beecham Group plc v. Europharm of Worthington, 
Ltd., [1996] E.C.R. I-6285, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996) [hereinafter Merck v. Primescrown]; Case 158/86, Warner Bros. 
Inc. and Metronome Video, aps v. Christiansen, [1998] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684 (1988) [hereinafter Warner 
Bros. v. Christiansen].  
27
 See Cornish, Parallel Trade, supra note 25, at 11; Jehoram, Parallel Imports, supra note 25, at 495; Hugh C. Hansen, 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights at the Border: Continuing Battle over “Parallel Imports”, 536 PLI/Pat 39, 41 
(1998); Leaffer, Gray Market, supra note 24, at 351. 
28
 See Quality King Distribs., Inc., supra note 26. 
29
 See Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 28 IIC 623, 628-29 (1997) [hereinafter Heath, Parallel 
Imports]; J.S. Chard & C.J. Mellor, Intellectual Property and Parallel Imports, 12 THE WORLD ECON. 69, 70 (1989). 
30
 See Thomas Hays & Peter Hansen, Silhouette is not the Proper Case upon Which to Decide the Parallel Importation 
Question, E.I.P.R. 1998, 20(7), 278-79 [hereinafter Hays, Silhouette]. 
31
 Professor Leaffer has given a vivid description about the relation between parallel imports and the gray market: “In some 
instances, the U.S. trademark owner is an importer of the goods as well, in which case the gray market goods are known as 
‘parallel importation’”.  See Leaffer, Gray Market, supra note 24, at 351. 
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parallel imports mainly emphasize the unauthorized imports from foreign markets.  The gray market is formed 
after the parallel imports, which focuses on the coexistence and competition of the genuine products imported 
and the products under the same brand, the same invention or the same copyright work originally circulating in 
the native market.  
 
2.3.2 Parallel Import’s Implication of Interest Conflict between Intellectual Property Rights and 
International Free Trade 
Parallel imports, as unauthorized imports, encourage the intra-brand competition, unlike the inter-brand 
competition of ordinary imports under the arranged marketing channels, because usually they bring the same 
products manufactured in the foreign country into the market of the manufacturer to compete with the originally 
circulated products.32  The threat of parallel imports to the manufacturer is the cheap price offered by the parallel 
importer as to the same product.  Generally, the price of the imported products is below the price in the native 
market, even though the parallel importers bear the transportation cost.33  With high competitive capability on 
price, theoretically and without the consideration of other factors, the imported products would supplant the 
same ones in the native market.  Consequently, the sale revenue of the manufacturer would decrease due to the 
price advantage of the imported products. 
 
The inducement of parallel imports mainly comes from the formation of the environment with the difference 
of price.34  The difference of price leads to the room of arbitrage, that is, the parallel importer purchases the 
cheaper products in the foreign market, and then imports them into the native market with an advantageous price 
to invade the market share of the manufacturer.35  The global environment with the difference of price as to the 
same product may be made by the change of the exchange rate between currencies or the price discrimination 
strategy of the manufacturer.  When the currency in the import country appreciates and the product price is not 
adjusted according to the currency change, the environment with the difference of price automatically looms to 
attract the parallel importers to enter the native market.36  On the occasion of the price discrimination, unlike the 
environment with difference of price formed by the change of the international economy, the different price is 
manipulated by the manufacturer.37  In order to make an efficient marketing, the manufacturer usually sets up an 
individual price as to the same product in the different market according to the purchase capability and other 
factors in each market.38  Therefore, the parallel importer may obtain the product sources in a cheap market and 
then deliver the products to the market with the advantageous price for sale. 
 
The free-riding act is also a possible factor to aggravate the difference of price in the international markets.39  
On the import and marketing of the products, the parallel importer usually just enjoys the fruitful result of 
promotion of the products in the native market without contribution to efforts the manufacturer has made.   
 
                                                          
32
 See Vautier, Economic Consideration, supra note 25, at 5-7; Hugh C. Hansen, International Exhaustion: A Policy and 
Psychological Analysis of the Debate, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY (Volume 6) 114-2 to -5 (Huge C. Hansen 
ed., 2001). 
33
 See LIPNER, GARY MARKET GOODS, supra note 25, at 3; ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS, supra note 24, at 1. 
34
 See David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, 
37 J. INT’L ECON. 167, 169-170 (1994); Robert J. Staaf, International Price Discrimination and the Gray Market, 4 I.P.J. 301, 
325 (1989) [hereinafter Staaf, Price Discrimination]. 
35
 See Vautier, Economic Consideration, supra note 25, at 4. 
36
 See Leaffer, Gray Market, supra note 24, at 351; LIPNER, GARY MARKET GOODS, supra note 25, at 3-4. 
37
 Cf. Staaf, Price Discrimination, supra note 34, at 327 (“Price discrimination resulting from trade restrictions is not caused 
by market, but rather government, power”).   
38
 See Vautier, Economic Consideration, supra note 25, at 3. 
39See OECD, Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Synthesis Report on Parallel Imports, COM/DAFFE/COMP/TD 
(2002)18/FINAL, at 8-9 [hereinafter the OECD Report].  But see Robert J. Staaf, The Law and Economics of the 
International Gary Market: Quality Assurance, Free-Riding and Passing Off, 4 I.P.J. 191, 235 (1989) [hereinafter Staaf, 
Free-Riding] (The author thinks that the free-rider argument is weakened when the parallel importer charges a lower price 
and offers the same quality and services as the authorized sellers).  
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Moreover, the parallel importer rarely provides any warranty and service about the sale of products.   The saving 
of the promotion cost and the warranty cost for the parallel importer imperceptibly fosters the difference of price 
between the importing country and the exporting country.40 
 
The issue of parallel imports under law or economy has been complicated, even though the value of the 
parallel import just stands a small part of the total import value in the global trade.41  In particular, when parallel 
imports involved the law aspect, they spark important disputes about whether parallel imports should be 
protected or prohibited under intellectual property rights, and how to achieve this policy goal.42  Up to now, the 
dispute has not been settled in the global community.43  Basically, the issue of parallel imports involves the 
collision of the free trade principle with the protection of intellectual property rights because the manufacturer in 
the native market is usually the owner of intellectual property rights. 44   Parallel imports are an importing act.  
Under the free trade principle, the parallel imports of products should not be restrained by any quantitative trade 
restriction of governments.  Through the elimination of the trade barriers, the international market can ensure the 
free movement of goods and the sufficient competition of commodities so that the customers have a chance to 
enjoy the benefit under the competitive prices.  However, it is not certain under legal interpretation whether 
allowing intellectual property rights to block parallel imports under law constitutes a quantitative trade 
restriction of a government, and whether unlimited protection of intellectual property rights indeed impedes the 
free trade of products. 
 
From the angle of the protection of intellectual property rights, the distribution right under intellectual 
property laws gives the owner a right to control the movement of goods and further decide whether the products 
may be imported according to its interest assessment.  If the free trade principle can exceed the consideration of 
intellectual property rights, that is, the parallel import is free from prevention, the incentive of the owner of 
intellectual property rights to invent, create or market new things will be weaken.45  The owner of intellectual 
property rights will also consider quitting from the international market because the cheap products 
manufactured in the foreign markets are often used by the parallel importer to put its own original products in the 
native market and cut off the source of revenue that is necessary to maintain the basic incentive under 
intellectual property rights. 46 
 
The issue of parallel imports reveals that its resolution needs to consider the two conflicting interests - the 
interest of free trade with a reflecting benefit on customers and the interest of intellectual property rights.  
Consequently, it is important to balance the two interests while seeking a legal method to deal with the issue of 
parallel imports.   
                                                          
40
 See Leaffer, Gray Market, supra note 24, at 352. 
41
 The value of parallel imports per year in the U.S. is estimated at $10 billion.  See Id.  However, according to the statistics 
made by the World Trade Organization [hereinafter the WTO], the import value of the merchandise of the U.S. in 2007 is 
$2,020.4 billion.  See The WTO, International Trade Statistics 2007, Table 1.8 Leading Exporters and Importers in world 
merchandise trade, 2007, at 12, available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_world_trade_dev_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (on file with 
author).  Additionally, the percentage of parallel import value in the total market value among six main countries of parallel 
imports in the EU is from 5% to 15%.  See TIMOTHY J. ATKINSON, REUTERS BUSINESS INSIGHT, THE GLOBAL PARALLEL 
TRADE OUTLOOK 2001-2006: A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 96-97 (2001). 
42
 See Abbott, First Reports, supra note 21, at 608.  On interest conflicts of international trades between developed countries 
and developing ones, please see Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A 
Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT—STRATEGIES TO 
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 155 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007). 
43
 See the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, Article 6 (“For the purpose of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to 
the provisions of Article 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights.”) 
44
 See Abbott, First Reports, supra note 21, at 608. 
45
 See the OECD Report, supra note 39, ¶ 52, at 16. 
46
 See Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 34, at 190. 
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2. 4 Balancing Intellectual Property Rights and International Free Trade in Terms of Parallel Imports 
by Intellectual Property Laws 
In order to resolve the issue of parallel imports and balance the conflicting interests between free trade and 
intellectual property rights, it is necessary to find an appropriate approach or a combination of approaches under 
the legal system.  When the legal approach is chosen, then the next concern will be how to use it to resolve the 
disputed issues through incorporating a policy or economic consideration into legislation and legal interpretation.   
 
Under intellectual property laws, the exhaustion doctrine, regardless of its theoretical basis from the 
Anglo-American law system or the continental law system, is used to deal with the issue of parallel imports.  The 
exhaustion doctrine operates to release the control of the intellectual property owner over the disposal of the 
products by exhausting the related intellectual property right—the distribution right.  It appears on the surface 
that the exhaustion doctrine favours the parallel importer.  As a matter of fact, it is not the case.  The doctrine is 
justified on the interest consideration of both intellectual property rights and the disposal of ownership.  It gives 
the owner of intellectual property rights an exclusive right to market the products protected under intellectual 
property rights for the initial sales.  When the first sale of the products is done, the reward is assumed, and 
intellectual property rights governing the distribution of goods are terminated, that is, under no circumstances 
can the owner of intellectual property rights control the second time of or later sales conducted by the successive 
buyers.  Consequently, the doctrine, in the issue of parallel imports, is more effective to probe into the reward for 
intellectual property rights and the impact on the free trade of products.  By drawing a definite boundary for the 
protection of intellectual property rights—the first sale—it reconciles the interest conflicts between free trade 
and intellectual property rights. 
 
Nevertheless, the deficiency in the exhaustion doctrine is reflected in the lack of the international 
consensus on the territorial scope of the first sale of products protected under intellectual property rights.  The 
exhaustion doctrine with the broadest territorial scope of the first sale is the international exhaustion.  That is, the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights occurs regardless of which market in any country in the world the first 
sale is put into.  The region exhaustion usually allows intellectual property rights to be exhausted provided that 
the first sale is conducted in any market under a region of countries, like customs union.  The narrowest 
territorial scope of the first sale is under the national exhaustion doctrine.  In other words, the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights is limited to the situation where the first sale is done in the domestic market in which 
the owner of intellectual property rights is protected under law.  
 
Since intellectual property laws can explore the protection and the limitation of intellectual property rights, 
it is appropriate for intellectual property laws to serve as a primary approach.  In spite of the lack of an 
international consensus in the marketing territory of the first sale of the products, the deficiency can be rectified 
through the TRIPS Agreement under the WTO. 
2.5 Intellectual Property Laws—the Exhaustion Doctrine 
The exhaustion doctrine has a collateral development under the Anglo-American law system and the continental 
law system.  The exhaustion doctrine under the Anglo-American law system is formed by incorporating the 
theory of implied license, the theory of universality and the first sale doctrine.  The continental exhaustion 
doctrine, compared with the Anglo-American one, is developed by a uniform and simple way.   
2.5.1 The Anglo-American Law System 
The Anglo-American exhaustion doctrine includes the theory of implied license, the theory of universality and 
the first sale doctrine.  Accordingly, it will help explain the essence of the doctrine by observing the operating of 
the three important legal concepts. 
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A. Implied License 
The theory of implied license may be used against the control of intellectual property rights over parallel 
imports, which can result in the exhaustion of intellectual property rights about parallel imports.  In other words, 
as long as the implied license is affirmed under law, the owner of intellectual property rights will be deprived of 
the right to block parallel imports.  When the owner of intellectual property rights sells its products protected by 
intellectual property rights without any reservation or restriction on the marketing territory, the buyer can freely 
make any disposal in the future, even including the parallel import.47  Upon observing the legal system 
internationally, as a method to resolve the conflict between parallel imports and intellectual property rights, the 
application of the theory of implied license was rooted in the United Kingdom, and spreads its influence on the 
common law system, except U.S. law.48 However, the theory of implied license is usually used to resolve the 
issue of parallel imports under patented products.  According to the practice experience of the legal system, it 
seems that its application range is rarely stretching out the fields of trademark and copyright. 
 
The application of the theory of implied license needs to be through courts’ interpretation in each individual 
case.  This undoubtedly produces some uncertainty about the development of parallel imports.  Nevertheless, just 
owing to the characteristic of uncertainty, judges in the courts have broader room to consider the scope of 
implied license in specific objective circumstances to balance the interests between parallel imports and 
intellectual property rights.49   
 
B. Universality 
Unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks have a stronger relation with business activities.  Naturally, the main 
purpose of business activities is to make profits.  As a result, business activities under trademarks should be not 
obstructed by a nation’s border because profits can be made and flow across the borders.50  Based on this 
concept, the theory of universality is created.  This theory reflects the enforcement of trademark law 51 and the 
resolution between trademarks and parallel imports under a common law system, including the United States.52  
Although the theory of universality seems to favour parallel imports by limiting trademark rights, “the confusion 
exception” exists to balance the interests between parallel imports and trademark rights, that is, when the 
imported goods could result in the confusion of customers to the same goods originally circulated in the native 
market, parallel imports would be prevented under trademark law.53  Another exception comes from the 
independent goodwill of trademark owner in the native mark, playing the same function as the confusion 
exception to favour trademark rights by turning the theory of universality back to the territoriality concept.54 
                                                          
47
 See Heath, Parallel Imports, supra note 29, at 624. 
48
 See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Intellectual Property Protection and International Trade—
Exhaustion of Rights Revisited, 1 WORLD COMPETITION 115, 117-119 (1992).  Under U.S. law, the theory of implied license is 
usually used to determine whether the use of the patented product after purchasing constitutes an infringement under patent 
law.  If the use is within the implied license through interpretation, the use is a legal act, for example, repairs of the product.  
On the contrary, if the use is beyond the reasonable expectation of  an implied license, the use is infringing in the patent, for 
example, the reconstruction of the product.  Regarding the distinction and the possible interplay between the theory of 
implied license and the first sale doctrine (the exhaustion doctrine) under U.S. law, see Amber Hatfield Rovner, Practical 
Guide to Application of (or Defense Against) Product-Based Infringement Immunities under the Doctrines of Patent 
Exhaustion and Implied License, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 227 (2004); Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: 
Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423 (1999).  
49
 See Alexander J. Stack, TRIPS, Patent Exhaustion and Parallel Imports, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 657, 672 (1998). 
50
 See HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION, supra note 6, at 29-30; James E. Inman, Gary Marketing of Imported Trademarked 
Goods: Tariffs and Trademark Issues, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 59, 85 (1993). 
51
 The theory of universality applied on the enforcement of trademark leads to the extraterritorial effect of U.S. Trademark 
Law.  The classic case under U.S. Trademark law is Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).    
52
 Regarding the understanding of the background, see HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION, supra note 6, at 32-36; ROTHNIE, 
PARALLEL IMPORTS, supra note 24, at 13-15. 
53
 The confusion mainly comes from the different qualities of imported products.  Case law has shown the impact of 
confusion on the application of the universality.  See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (1993) (the U.S. 
case); Colgate-Palmolive Ltd. v. Markwell Finance Ltd. [1989] RPC 497 (the U.K case). 
54
 The exception protects the investment and goodwill an independent trademark owner has made in the local market.  An 
independent trademark owner indicates that, on the commodities under trademark, the owner has no business relationship 
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There is another development to the status of universality. This occurs in the Anglo-Commonwealth 
countries.  Under copyright law of these countries, the territoriality concept is strictly stuck.55  Parallel imports 
could be an illegal act through the interpretation of the provisions regarding secondary infringement.56  However, 
it is possible to save parallel imports out of secondary infringement by giving the elements of secondary 
infringement a more narrow interpretation.57  Additionally, the legislations in Australia and New Zealand, which 
exempt parallel imports under specific situations from copyright infringement, are also a favourable way to 
parallel imports.58  The two methods, as a matter of fact, serve as a propeller to drive the traditional territoriality 
concept toward the universality one.      
 
C. The First Sale Doctrine 
The first sale doctrine, among the countries under the common law system, appears only in the United States.  It 
focuses on the marketing of products and distinguishes the two marketing stage—the first marketing and the 
future marketing after the first one.  This doctrine is justified upon balancing between the movement of goods 
and intellectual property rights by giving the owner of intellectual property rights an exclusive right to put 
products into market for the first time and leaving the buyer the future disposal right on products after the first 
marketing.  When the owner of intellectual property rights sold products protected by intellectual property rights 
in the market, the owner has no right to interfere in whom the buyer would like sell products to or what market 
the buyer would put products into later.59 
 
On the issue of parallel imports, the first sale doctrine in the U.S. is applied in the fields of patent and 
copyright.60  Whether the doctrine could exhaust intellectual property rights to favour parallel imports is rested 
upon interpretation for the territory of the first marketing, that is, whether the territory of the first marketing is 
limited to the U.S. market.61  Certainly, the type of parallel imports is also considered.  
 
In the U.S. experience about the first sale doctrine, on dealing with the issue of parallel imports, there are 
other external factors interfering with the application of the first doctrine.  Under copyright law, the concept of 
territoriality - whether the manufacture is located within the U.S. - is sometimes considered a decisive factor to  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
with the foreign firms as a type of parent-subsidiary or affiliation.  If a trademark owner has this relationship, its business 
operation, under law, is considered to be connected with that of the foreign countries.  From this, it is hard to block parallel 
imports from the foreign countries due to the concept of the international corporate group.  However, case law has some 
preference for the goodwill protection of the independent trademark owner.  In this situation, the trademark owner can 
prevent parallel imports of the same commodities from the foreign market.  See Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 
(1923) (the U.S. case).  
55
 See ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS, supra note 24, at 194-199. 
56
 Regarding the understanding of the background, see id. at 189-94. 
57
 One element of secondary infringement under Anglo-Commonwealth law is that the manufacture of the imported article 
would have infringed copyright if it was made in the domestic market. This is “the hypothetical manufacturing requirement” 
for secondary infringement.  The interpretation of “the manufacturer” becomes very important in the establishment of 
secondary infringement.  If the manufacturer is limited to “the actual maker”, imported products that are made by the 
copyright owner or its licensee shall not constitute secondary infringement because the parallel importer is not the actual 
maker.  But the opposite result would happen while the interpretation of the manufacturer is “hypothetically” construed as the 
importer, even if the parallel importer gets its products made by the copyright owner or its licensee in the foreign country.  
See id. at 199-292.    
58
 Regarding the understanding of the background, see Kerrin M. Vautier, Exhaustion and Parallel Imports in New Zealand 
and Australia, in PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA 177-186 (Christopher Heath ed., 2004) [hereinafter Vautier, New Zealand and 
Australia]; Abraham Van Melle, Parallel Importing in New Zealand : Historical Origins, Recent Developments, and Future 
Directions, E.I.P.R. 1999, 21(2), 63-87. 
59
 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 [A] (2010); LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 14, §8.14 [A]. 
60
 See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc., supra note 26 (Copyright); Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 26 
F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Patent). 
61
 The issue is the core of this article, being related with the policy choice about the exhaustion doctrine.  It will be discussed 
and evaluated later. 
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decide whether copyright is exhausted to favour parallel imports under the application of the first sale doctrine.62  
Moreover, under patent law, the interpretation of licensing also influences the application of the first sale 
doctrine.63 
2.5.2 The Continental Law System 
The exhaustion doctrine under the continental law system, similar to the first sale doctrine in the United States, is 
often applied to the issue of parallel imports.64  Its justification basis, as with first sale doctrine, is to retain a 
right to make a first marketing of products for the owner of intellectual property rights as a reward.65  After the 
first marketing, the buyer has a right to dispose of the products without any consent from the owner of 
intellectual property rights.66   Certainly, like the first sale doctrine, the important factor influencing the 
resolution of the parallel import cases is the interpretation of the territory of the first marketing.  To take the EU 
for example, if the first marketing is limited to the EU, the parallel import coming from other non-EU countries 
could be blocked from entering the EU market.   
 
Compared with the Anglo-American law system, on treating the issue of parallel imports, the exhaustion 
doctrine of the continental law system seems plain and simple.  The exhaustion doctrine may be applied in the 
fields of patent, trademark and copyright without any inconsistency or conflict.67  Further, the doctrine must 
concern only the marketing acts.  Consequently, the place of manufacture of products never takes part in 
deciding the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.   Moreover, the interpretation of the license agreement 
between the owner of intellectual property rights and foreign distributors also has no influence on the application 
of the exhaustion doctrine, as long as the products have been put into the market with the owner’s consent, or 
through its authorization.68  Finally, there still is the territoriality concept driven to serve an exception of the 
exhaustion doctrine, similar to the exceptions of the universality theory under the Anglo-American law system.69  
However, the scope of the exception under the exhaustion doctrine seems narrower than that under the 
universality theory.70 
 
                                                          
62
 See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc., 738 F.2d 424(3d Cir. 1984).  In the case under Supreme Court favoring parallel imports by 
the first sale doctrine—Quality King Distribs., Inc.  v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc. 523 U.S. 135(1998)—the issue of the 
manufacture place is not mentioned because the products under the case are made in the U.S.  From this, it is uncertain about 
if there would be a different treatment under Supreme Court while the products are made outside the U.S.  Recently, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has decided to explore  this issue again to make sue whether the copyrighted products made outside the U.S. 
would prevent the first sale doctrine from being applied.  See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 541 F.3d 982 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
63
 See Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931 (D. N.J. 1983) (the right of the U.S. exclusive 
licensee against the parallel import is not exhausted, even though the right of patentee has been exhausted because it made 
and marketed its products in the foreign market). 
64
 See HAYS, PARALLEL IMPORTATION, supra note 24, ¶ 1.08. 
65
 See Heath, Parallel Imports, supra note 29, at 625. 
66
 See Yusuf & Hase, supra note 48, at 119-120. 
67
 See, e.g., Merck v. Primecrown (patent), supra note 26; Silhouette v. Hartlauer (trademark), supra note 26; Warner Bros. 
v. Christiansen, supra note 26 (copyright); Case C479/04 Laserdisken v. Kulturministeriet, [2007] 1 C.M.L.R. 6. (copyright). 
68
 However, under E.U. law, the assignment of trademark may be a reason to block the parallel import coming from other 
Member State.  See Case 9/93, IHT International Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, [1994] E.C.R. I-2789, [1994] 
3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994). 
69
 Article 7(2) of E.C. Trademark Directive: 
Paragraph 1 [The exhaustion of trade mark] shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the  
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is 
changed or impaired after they have been put on the market. 
70
  By literal interpretation, it seems that the confusion exception under the theory of universality can be covered in Article 
7(2) of E.C. Trademark Directive.  But it is worth further exploring if the exception of the independent goodwill is also 
within the provision. 
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3. The International Arguments about the Scope of the Exhaustion Doctrine in Terms of Parallel 
Imports—Should Intellectual Property Rights Be Subordinated to the Global Free 
Movement of Goods?  
3.1 Proponents of International Exhaustion in Terms of Parallel Imports 
The international exhaustion of intellectual property rights represents a situation where international free trade 
gets beyond the protection of intellectual property rights, when the first reward of intellectual property rights has 
been assumed upon the first sale of products protected under the rights in any market in the world.   In other 
words, the owner of intellectual property rights has lost the right to control the movement of products in the 
future, provided that it or its agents marketed the products first in any country.  From this perspective, after the 
first sale, the products under intellectual property rights will flow freely beyond the country’s borders according 
to any transaction.  This has an important implication for international free trade.  Usually, those who support the 
international exhaustion mainly focus on its function of promoting international free trade for goods.71  Through 
international free trade, the goods can have fair and sufficient competition, and the utmost benefit of competition 
will be reflected in the consumption of the customers.  Additionally, while Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement 
adopts an approach to avoid a uniform norm about exhaustion, the proponents of international exhaustion are 
convinced that the international exhaustion of intellectual property rights is affirmed under the free trade 
principle under the WTO.72 
 
There is a possible view attempting to interpret the phenomenon where the international exhaustion policy is 
pervasive among the developing countries.  The main position rests upon the adoption of the international 
exhaustion policy in these countries, which reflects some resistance toward the protection of intellectual property 
rights,73 just as the hostility of the developing countries for the TRIPS Agreement existed in the long period of 
struggle against the substantive minimum protection of intellectual property rights.74  As a matter of fact, the 
position shows a lack of comprehensive consideration about the relation between international free trade and 
intellectual property rights, driven to an ideological conclusion.  First, unlike the mandatory substantive rights 
under the TRIP Agreement, the scope of the distribution right deduced from the exhaustion doctrine seems vague 
and uncertain.  Moreover, according to Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, the member states can decide the 
exhaustion doctrine fitting the national trade policy by its discretion.  It is weak to assert that supporting 
international exhaustion is a reflection of opposition to the substantive minimum standard for the protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
Second, it is still uncertain eventually to what extent the protection of intellectual property rights will 
enhance international free trade, or at least not set up the barriers of trade.75  Let me make a hypothesis—the  
                                                          
71
 See S.K. Verma, Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 IIC 
534, 552 (1998); Herman Cohen Jehoram, International Exhaustion versus Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual 
Property Law at 13 (1996), available at  
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/cohen_jehoram/Cohen2.doc (last visited Oct. 4, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Jehoram, International Exhaustion]. 
72
 See Verma, supra note 71, at 565-67.    
73See Frederick M. Abbott, Second Report (Final) to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law 
Association on the Subject of the Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Importation, at 32 (2000) 
[hereinafter Abbott, Second Report] (Professor Hugh Hansen’s presentation record); Jayashree Watal, The TRIPS Agreement 
and Developing Countries Strong, Weak or Balance Protection?, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 281, 283 (1998) (“ Some see this 
provision [of Article 6 of TRIPS] as a major policy option for developing countries to attenuate the ill effects of strong 
intellectual property protection, apart from unfair duplication of the rights of IPR holders.” ) (alteration in original) (note  
omitted). 
74
 See Charles McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1290 
(1998). 
75
 See Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affects International 
Trade Flows at 13, available at 
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higher level of protection of intellectual property rights produces freer international movement and competition 
of goods.  Under this hypothesis, if the developing countries are still adopting the policy of international 
exhaustion to resolve the cases of parallel imports, it is rational to comment that the developing countries objects 
to the intellectual property rights because the international exhaustion is not only harmful to free trade, but also 
intellectual property rights.  However, the international current status is not the case.  Upon the lack of strong 
evidence showing that the protection of intellectual property rights would advance international free trade, it is 
probable that international exhaustion is made by the developing countries merely as a policy to improve the 
import trades, not as a tool to resist intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement.  This situation, 
especially, is observed from the fact that the imperative imports of pharmaceuticals in some developing 
countries76 - these developing countries must rely on imports about products that they have no industrial capacity 
to develop themselves.77   
 
Finally, the policy of international exhaustion is not exclusive for the developing countries.  Some developed 
countries, for example, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, also use the policy to achieve the political or 
economic goal of the nation.78  From this, it is inappropriate to say that the international exhaustion is one of the 
basic policies against the TRIPS Agreement in the developing counties. 
3.2. Opponents of International Exhaustion 
Generally speaking, those who oppose the international exhaustion are concerned about the scope of exhaustion 
of intellectual property rights, though the exhaustion doctrine is basically accepted.  Some assert that the territory 
of the first sale of products under intellectual property rights should be limited, rather than expanded.  There is 
also one view to think that the characteristics of products protected by intellectual property rights should be 
considered.  Under this point, the products with specific characteristics should be given different treatment in the 
exhaustion, though other products are under the international exhaustion.  Another view is to make a thorough 
inquiry into the attributes of each intellectual property right and decide what intellectual property should apply 
limited exhaustion. 
3.2.1 National Exhaustion 
The supporters of national exhaustion tend to object strongly to the unlimited territory of the first sale of the 
products under intellectual property rights.  In their view, the exhaustion of intellectual property rights only 
occurs when the products under intellectual property rights are initially marketed in the native country where the 
owner of intellectual property rights is protected under law.  Consequently, any parallel import that is never 
marketed in the domestic market will be prevented from entering the domestic market by the owner of 
intellectual property rights, even though the owner has marketed these products in foreign countries.  The main 
purpose of the policy of national exhaustion is to protect the interest and local goodwill of the local 
manufacturer.79  After all, the same but cheaper products from parallel imports are not only a potential threat to 
the products domestically marketed by the manufacturer through the advantageous prices, but also create a 
likelihood of confusion of customers risking the local goodwill due to possible differences in the quality of 
products.     
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/02/24/000094946_99031911113671/Ren
dered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
76
 For instance, AIDS is very rampant in Saharan African countries and South Africa, and parallel imports are playing an 
important role in accessing the medicine for treatment.  See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s 
Intellectual Property Fight for Access to Aid Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 257 (2002); Carlos M. Correa, Public Health 
and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2001). 
77
 See McManis, supra note 74, at 1291. 
78
 See, e.g., BBS Wheels III—Decision of the Supreme Court July 1, 1997—Case No. H6-(Ne)-3272, 29 IIC 331(1998) 
(Regarding BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik A.G. v. Racimex Japan Corp. and Japan Auto Products Co.); Louise Longdin, Parallel 
Importing Post TRIPS: Convergence and Divergence in Australia and New Zealand, 50 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 54 (2001); 
AbrahamVan Melle, Parallel Importing in New Zealand: Historical Origins, Recent Developments, and Future Directions, 
E.I.P.R. 1999, 21(2), 63-87. 
79
 See Yusuf & Hase, supra note 48, at 130. 
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3.2.2 Modified International Exhaustion 
In spite of paying heed to the importance of international free trade in the national economy, some proponents of 
international exhaustion simultaneously consider other interests.  These interests come from the promotion of 
specific industry, the maintenance of common market and the protection of some intellectual property rights.  In 
order to balance the benefits of international exhaustion in stimulating free trade and above-mentioned special 
interests, the policy of modified international exhaustion of intellectual property rights is proposed.  
a) International Exhaustion with the Exception of Products of High R&D Industries 
High R&D (Research and Development) Industries, as implied by the name, usually sink a heavy investment in 
the research and development of products.80  The manufacture and marketing of products completely rest upon 
whether the research and development could be successful.  There is high uncertainty in products.  In the 
pharmaceutical industries, the new drug needs the clinical experiment and the examination of the medical 
authority.  In the end, only a low percentage of new drugs could pass all tests and enter the market.81  
Consequently, the pharmaceutical industries often cannot recover the high cost of R&D, provided that the new 
drug failed to have the approval of the medical authority.82  Additionally, the life cycle of products under the 
high R&D industries is short, because the technological advance is going fast and the market competition is 
intense, that is, the high R&D industries must continuously engage in conducting inventions and improving the 
present products through the R&D expenditure to survive in the market.  The short life cycle of products 
aggravates difficulties in recovering the high R&D cost. 
 
In view of the importance of high R&D industries on the technological development and the healthy life of 
humans, it is proposed that the products of high R&D industries, at least the pharmaceutical ones, be exempted 
from the application of the international exhaustion doctrine.83  Based on this thought, it could be predicted that 
the international exhaustion of intellectual property rights would make the R&D high industries lose the 
incentives for continuous invention and development because it seems that intellectual property rights cannot 
help them relieve the burden of the high R&D cost, especially in the case of parallel imports. 
b)  International Exhaustion with Limited Geographical Application—Regional Exhaustion 
In terms of promoting the free movement and competition of goods in the market, the policy of regional 
exhaustion is just a new form of international exhaustion.  Instead of setting the marketing scope of the first sale 
of products under intellectual property rights in any market in the world, the policy of regional exhaustion, by 
considering the special political or economic interest of the customs union or free trade areas, limits the 
marketing scope of the first sale to any market in the specific region.   
 
The policy of regional exhaustion within the EU is a vivid example.  The main purpose of the EU regional 
exhaustion is to maintain the economic development and integration of the EU common market.84  Basically, the 
EU never denies the benefits of the policy of international exhaustion, and merely creates a position of 
reservation on its application, because the EU has misgivings about whether the application of international  
                                                          
80
 Generally speaking, software industries, biotech industries and pharmaceutical industries are among the High R&D 
industries.   
81
 See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for 
Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 208-10 (1999) 
(“[R]ecent studies have shown that about only one in 65,000 compounds synthesized by pharmaceutical laboratories are [sic] 
successful….”). 
82
 The estimated cost for developing a new drug in 1990 is $500 million.  See id. at 209.  See also Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The 
Conflicts between Parallel Trade and Product Access and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceutical, 1 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 
637, 642 (1998) (“Research-based companies must depend upon a few highly successful drugs (with sales of over, say, $750 
million per year) to survive and continue investments in research and development.”).  
83
 See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 81, at 259 & 262. 
84
 See HAYS, PARALLEL IMPORTATION, supra note 24, ¶¶ 1.11 to .12. 
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exhaustion would hurt the firms of the EU around the world.85  From this perspective, the EU thinks that the 
policy of international exhaustion is not suitable for the EU at the current stage.86  However, the member states 
in the EU are allowed to adopt the policy of international exhaustion toward the third countries through the 
international bilateral or multilateral treaties, though regional exhaustion is mandatory among member states in 
the EU87     
c)  International Exhaustion subject to Specific Intellectual Property Right 
One question involves whether patent, trademark and copyright should be applied by a coherent exhaustion 
policy in the cases of parallel imports.  Some scholars think that the exhaustion policy should be differently 
treated according to the particular characteristics of each intellectual property right.88  The patent system is 
established to encourage and promote the development of science and technology by giving the inventor some 
exclusive rights as a reward.  Despite the strong exclusiveness of patent that would intervene in inventing or in 
the commercial activities of others, the patent system is still justified by the fact that patent just provides an 
incentive for inventor to develop technology, and the ultimate benefit is for society rather than the inventor.  On 
the most important aspect, the patent is enjoyed in the limited period.  This effectively assuages the monopoly of 
patent over the invention.  As a consequence, even though the policy of national exhaustion is adopted in the 
field of patent, the negative impact on international free trade in the cases of parallel imports would be limited.89 
 
On the aspect of copyright, similar to patent, the copyright system provides with some exclusive rights as an 
incentive to the creator for stimulating the creation of new artistic or scientific works to enhance the 
development of human culture and society.  Copyright also has its limited period.  In addition, the subject matter 
protected under copyright law is limited to the expression of works, not the ideas.  After assessing the attributes 
of copyright, it seems to reach the same conclusion that there is a stronger reason to support the national 
exhaustion of copyright.90 
 
Compared with patent and copyright, trademark is closer to commercial activities.  The main purpose of the 
trademark system is to establish a fair commodity competition in the market.  In other words, trademark law is 
enacted to avoid the confusion of customers about the original trademark by providing appropriate remedy for 
the trademark owner, when other people use identical or similar trademarks on the same or similar products.  
Although trademark law, undeniably, gives some exclusive rights for the protection of the trademark owner’s 
incentive to develop and market new products and brands, the interest scope of the trademark owner under 
trademark law is not triggered by the investment that the trademark owner made in the products, but by other 
competitors’ unfair market activities.  Consequently, only when other competitors pass off the original trademark 
in the market to confuse consumers can the trademark owner assert the infringement of trademark for remedy.  
From this perspective, in the case of parallel imports, if the imported products are the same as ones marketed in 
the domestic market—there is no likelihood of customer confusion—it is not justified to block the imports 
according to the national exhaustion doctrine.91  Additionally, the protection of trademark is without time limit, 
as long as the trademark is used incessantly in the market.  This characteristic also fosters the application of 
international exhaustion for trademark in the case of parallel imports.     
                                                          
85
 See NERA, The Economic Consequences of the Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the Area of Trademarks, Final Report 
for DG XV of the European Commission, at 105-06 (1999) [hereinafter NERA, the Choice of Regime Report]. 
86
 Kimberly Reed, Levi Strauss v. Tesco and E.U. Trademark Exhaustion: A Proposal for Change, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
139, 178 (2002). 
87
 See Willy Alexander, Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights in the European Economic Area, E.L. REV. 1999, 24(1), 63 
[hereinafter Alexander, Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights]. 
88
 See Cornish, Parallel Trade, supra note 25, at 13-17; Abbott, Second Report, supra note 73, at 32-33 (Professor William 
Cornish’s presentation record). 
89
 See Cornish, Parallel Trade, supra note 25, at 13-15. 
90
 See id. at 15. 
91
 Id. at 15-16. 
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3.3 Policy Arguments for Divided Positions 
The academic arguments about the exhaustion doctrine and the issue of parallel import may be carried out from 
both the policy aspect and the economic analysis.  The policy arguments and the economic ones respectively 
represent discrepant meaning in the formation of a law policy.  The policy arguments are concerned about the 
justification of the policy, while the economic ones pay much attention to the efficiency and welfare of the 
policy. 
3.3.1. Policy Arguments for International Exhaustion in Terms of Parallel Imports 
There are seven reasons for proponents of the international exhaustion policy to fight for their standpoint. 
a)  Strengthening Product and Price Free Competition 
An important benefit from international exhaustion in the case of parallel imports is to enhance the free 
competition of products.92  Even though the imported products are the same as ones circulating in the domestic 
market, the customers are still enjoying the product choice and the price comparison in making a final decision 
on buying products.93  Especially, when the possibility of competition through inter-brand products is eliminated 
or reduced by the strong exclusive rights of intellectual property rights, it shows more desirability for 
international exhaustion applied in the case of parallel imports to protect the right of customers about the 
competitive price. 
b)  Preventing Market Monopoly  
Although the exclusive power of intellectual property rights does not account for a kind of monopoly in the 
market, it helps form the market monopoly.  Generally speaking, intellectual property rights, especially patent 
and copyright, have strong power to prevent the copying or imitating products.  From this, the products copying 
or imitating the products protected under patent or copyright will be completely blocked from the market.  If the 
intellectual property holder has some degree of market power and there are no substitutes for the products 
protected under intellectual property rights, the market for the products dominated by the holder is approaching 
the monopolization.94  Under market monopoly, the arrangement for products and the establishment of product 
prices are exclusively decided by the owner of intellectual property rights.  The adoption of the international 
exhaustion policy can lead some products with lower prices in the foreign countries to the domestic market.  This 
importation would activate the competition of the market, even though the competition might be limited to an 
intra-brand competition.  The lower prices of the imported products, at the very least, can destroy the price 
establishment under the market monopoly, further weakening the monopolized market barriers for possible 
substituted products.  Certainly, the monopolization of market needs to be resorted to competition law to resolve 
thoroughly the abuse of market power. 
 
c)  Reducing Market Collusion  
Market collusion often occurs when the authorized distributors of products in the same country reach an 
unvoiced pact among them to raise the unit price of a product.  The price adjustment is out of the market scheme 
of the manufacturer.  The manufacturer (the owner of intellectual property rights) always successfully monitors 
and corrects the situation according to the agreement or the internal discipline.  Consequently, the international 
exhaustion policy in the case of parallel imports is expected to collapse the collusion.  The lower price of 
products through parallel imports inhibits the market effects brought by colluding in the product price.  
Sometimes, parallel imports are considered a tool to resolve the collusion of authorized distributors by the 
manufacturer.95  
 
                                                          
92
 See Bale, supra note 82, at 644; Verma, supra note 71, at 558. 
93
 See Abbott, First Reports, supra note 21, at 612. 
94
 See LIPNER, GARY MARKET GOODS, supra note 25, at 79-80. 
95
 See John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on 
Gray Market Imports, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 75, 80-81 (1988). 
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d)  National Exhaustion as a Non-Tariff Barrier under WTO 
 Under the national exhaustion policy of intellectual property rights, the intellectual property holder can take 
advantage of the exclusive rights under law to prevent the same products from entering the domestic market in 
the case of parallel imports.  In terms of the impact on free trade by the exercise of intellectual property rights, 
the national exhaustion policy obviously contradicts the fundamental aim of the WTO for promoting free trade.  
According to Article XI(1) of the GATT 1994, the national exhaustion policy can be interpreted as a kind of 
quantitative restriction against imports in the case of parallel imports.96  From this perspective, the national 
exhaustion policy is intolerable among the WTO Members because the quantitative restriction against imports is 
prohibited under the WTO.   
 
Additionally, another argument against the national exhaustion policy is rested upon the fact that the exercise 
of national exhaustion in the parallel imports would constitute a discrimination against the imported products.97  
Under national exhaustion, any product manufactured in the foreign countries without any marketing acts in the 
domestic market would be blocked from imports, if without obtaining the permission of the intellectual property 
holder.  Compared with the imported products, the same products circulating in the domestic market are 
protected thoroughly under the free trade principle and exempted from any intervention of the intellectual 
property holder, even without any consent.  The discrimination existing between imported products and native 
ones violates Article III(4) of the GATT 1994—the national treatment provision.98  
 
e)  Access to Medicines on the Basis of Human Rights 
The interaction of intellectual property rights and human rights has been the focus of much concern in the global 
community.99  One important issue involves the right to access health facilities and medicine.100  The concern 
comes from some serious epidemic and endemic diseases that are rampant in some developing countries, and 
most of these countries do not have enough industrial capacity to invent and develop new medicines to prevent, 
treat or control the diseases.  When the new medicines are protected under intellectual property rights, it is 
doubtful that the patients in the developing countries can get enough medicines with a reasonable and affordable 
price.101  The international exhaustion policy can be expected to solve the misgivings.  It would bring, through 
parallel imports, the drugs with lower price into the developing countries that are faced with the invasion of 
serious diseases but have been not qualified for the application of compulsory licenses under the TRIPS 
Agreement.102  From this perspective, the meaning of the international exhaustion policy is not only reflected in  
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 See Abbott, Second Report, supra note 73, at 30-31 (Thomas Cottier’s presentation record); Thomas Cottier, The WTO 
System and Exhaustion of Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM —COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 
PART TWO 1798-1800 (Frederick Abbott et al. eds., 1999); Verma, supra note 71, at 554; Abbott, First Reports, supra note 
21, at 632. 
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 See Verma, supra note 71, at 553-54; Abbott, First Reports, supra note 21, at 633-34. 
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 Article III(4) of the GATT 1994: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect 
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution, or use…. 
99
 Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection, 5 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 861, 866-
70 (2002). 
100
 See id. at 873-79. 
101
 See Frederick M. Abbott, The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at 
the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 469, 472-73(2002) [hereinafter Abbott, The Doha Declaration]. 
102
 Some developing countries with a potential capability to develop the pharmaceutical industry, like India and Brazil, may 
solve the problem of medication supplies and prices through asserting the compulsory licenses under Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  But for other countries without this production capacity to apply for the compulsory licenses, like South Africa, 
parallel imports are better to solve the same problem.  See id. at 494-97.  See also CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED 
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 81 (2007).  In order to make up the 
deficiency of Article 31 short of considering the production capacity of members, Article 31 bis was proposed to seek 
acceptance of members.  On the amendment of  the TRIPS Agreement, please see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
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the reconciliation of intellectual property rights and free trade, but also the deference of intellectual property 
rights to the global humanitarianism.  
 
f)  Promoting Export-oriented Economy in Developing Countries 
In view of the global economic structure, the developing countries play a significant role in the global export 
economy.103  Owing to the consideration of labour cost and other factors, the industries in developed countries 
often seek some developing countries as manufacturing bases to take advantage of favourable resources to 
manufacture products, and then export the final products through the global marketing network.  The 
phenomenon represents the possibility of technology transfer to the developing countries.  The technology 
transfer is with much meaning on balancing the global economy that the WTO is established to expect.104  
However, before the developing countries are capable of developing the manufacturing technology, apart from 
stimulating the job opportunities and increasing tax revenue, the indirect exports of the foreign industries merely 
contribute limited benefit to the export trade in the developing countries because many products for exports are 
entrusted to the local firms for assembling and manufacturing, and not under the brands of local firms. 
 
The international exhaustion policy would work to enhance the export trade in the developing countries.105  
The local firms in the developing countries can purchase competitive products under the foreign industries, and 
then export them to other countries, including the domestic market of the manufacturer, without any fear that the 
manufacturer would use intellectual property rights to block exports from entering the domestic market. 
 
g)  Eliminating Intellectual Property Misuse 
In the case of parallel imports, there is a situation occurring in which the owner of intellectual property rights 
attempts to take advantage of the labels or package protected under copyright to control the distribution of goods 
that the labels or packages are attached to.  The situation reflects a kind of intellectual property misuse to some 
extent.  The scope of copyright to control is limited to copyrightable labels or packages.  It is incidental that the 
manufacturer attached the labels or packages to the goods.  In other words, in the evaluation of copyright 
protection of the labels or packages, it is not necessary to consider the existence of goods.  If the copyright 
owner can successfully make use of inseparability of the labels or packages and goods in the commercial acts to 
control the distribution of goods, the scope of the exclusive right under copyright law has obviously been 
manipulated to reach some  non-copyrightable subject matters.  This is an improper extension of copyright.  In 
order to make the protection of labels or packages associated with goods, the manufacturer should assert the 
rights of trademark or trade dress.   
 
To resolve the problem of the copyright misuse, under the national exhaustion system, using legislation or 
judicial cases to exclude the copyright misuse from the protection of copyright is essential so that the same 
products with the copyrightable labels or packages can enter the domestic market safely.  However, the 
international exhaustion policy in the cases of parallel imports achieves the same goal with lower cost about the 
copyright misuse.  Under the international exhaustion system, copyright has been exhausted when the 
copyrightable labels or packages associated with goods are sold in the foreign market.  Consequently, in the case 
of parallel imports, there is no room for the manufacturer to abuse copyright when the goods enter the domestic  
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 The situation can be observed from the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing countries recently.  
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), World Investment Report 2010, at 6, 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
104
 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization States: 
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in  international trade  commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development,…. 
105
 See Yusuf & Hase, supra note 48, at 130 (“[T]erritorial exhaustion may undermine export-based economic development 
strategies of developing countries and countries undergoing transition to market economy.”) (alteration in original). 
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market.  The copyright misuse in the case of parallel imports is automatically cured by international 
exhaustion.106 
3.3.2 Arguments against International Exhaustion in Terms of Parallel Imports 
There are six reasons for opponents of the international exhaustion policy to support their stance. 
 
a)  Destructing Price Discrimination Scheme 
The price discrimination scheme is a more efficient approach to conduct international marketing around the 
world than the price uniformity approach.  The manufacturer may establish the discriminated prices in different 
countries according to the economic status of countries and the payment capability of people.107  Usually, the 
price discrimination scheme is designed to charge higher prices in countries where the demand elasticity about 
the products is relatively low (developed countries), and set lower prices for the countries with high demand 
elasticity (developing countries).108  This scheme takes advantage of high profits in the former countries to 
compensate for the possible loss in the latter countries to achieve a planned marketing goal.109 
 
The international exhaustion of intellectual property rights would break the price discrimination scheme.  In 
the cases of parallel imports, international exhaustion would make the products coming from the countries with 
high demand elasticity invade the countries with low elasticity by means of the advantageous low price.  From 
this, the efficient market separation under the price discrimination scheme never survives the impact of parallel 
imports.  In order to react to the situation caused by international exhaustion, the manufacturer (the owner of 
intellectual property rights) must adjust its marketing strategy toward the price uniformity scheme.110  In other 
words, with the aim of avoiding the products with lower price entering into the countries with high prices, the 
manufacturer tends to fix a uniform price, being lower than the price in the developed countries under the price 
discrimination scheme and higher than the one in the developing countries.  The result is that the customers in 
the developing countries, as a victim under international exhaustion, would bear greater financial burden for the 
products.  To make matters worse, it is even possible that the customers in the developing countries would be 
faced with the predicament of no supplies of the products, especially medicines for serious disease, because the 
manufacturer could abandon the markets in the developing countries provided that the impact of international 
exhaustion is intolerable.111    
b)  Encouraging the Arbitrage of Products 
Basically, parallel imports are a kind of arbitrage of products.  They occur when the price difference of products 
exists between the source market where the parallel importer purchases products with a lower price and the 
target market where the parallel importer would like to import the products with a higher price.  The price 
difference of products is usually caused by the price discrimination scheme of the manufacturer or the changes of 
the exchange rate between currencies.  Parallel imports may disappear when the price difference has been 
mitigated, or the transportation cost adding up to the price of product in the source market has exceeded the price 
of product in the target market.  This implicates the speculative characteristic of parallel imports.  Although the 
international exhaustion policy could enhance the free movement of goods to some extent in the cases of parallel 
imports, it simultaneously could encourage the arbitrage of products.  It is unwise to rely too much on parallel 
imports under the international exhaustion to activate free trade and price competition.  Parallel imports are 
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 See Quality King Distribs., Inc., supra note 26.  In this author’s opinion, this case is a vivid example showing that the 
international exhaustion of copyright cures the copyright misuse, although it is still controversial about whether the case 
represents the adoption of the international exhaustion policy in U.S. copyright law.     
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 See Carsten Fink, Entering the Jungle—The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Imports, in 
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 178 (Owen Lippert ed., 1999). 
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highly speculative and selective.  Even if the price discrimination scheme could lead to market monopoly and 
unfair competition, parallel imports under international exhaustion do not always work well on this problem 
because it all depends upon the interest measurement of the parallel importer if parallel imports would enter the 
market, instead of other consideration of public interests.  Consequently, in order to avoid the market monopoly 
and unfair competition that the price discrimination scheme could result in, it is more appropriate to appeal to 
competition law or other laws to examine the scheme, rather than have much expectation on parallel imports 
under international exhaustion. 
 
c)  Free Riding and Passing Off— Improper Appropriation of Manufacturer Goodwill and 
Consumer Confusion 
One important reason for opposing international exhaustion of intellectual property rights is that the parallel 
importer often appropriates goodwill or reputation that the manufacturer has established in the domestic market 
through long-term investment in the innovation and improvement of products, or enjoys the results of the 
product promotion and advertisement without any contribution.112  In other words, the parallel importer can save 
or ignore any cost about product administration and advertisement and then take advantage of the favourable 
product price to compete with the manufacturer or its authorized licensees.  The  parallel importer’s  concern is 
limited to the price by which it purchases the products in the source market, and the transportation cost by which 
the products in the source market can be delivered to the target market.  Since the goodwill about the products 
has been established and the advertisement expenditure has been disbursed by the manufacturer in the domestic 
market, the same products through parallel imports can enjoy the benefit of cost saving and reflect the benefit in 
pricing.  This is the so-called free riding problem. The free riding of parallel imports distorts the market pricing 
and creates unfair competition.  Consequently, the international exhaustion policy has some extent of instigating 
the free riding acts, given the policy is promoting parallel imports.  As an economic comment remarks, the 
benefit of the international exhaustion policy would be weakened, as long as some free riding acts involve in the 
parallel imports.113 
 
Another problem existing in parallel imports under international exhaustion is passing off.114  Since parallel 
imports are price-oriented—the parallel importer puts nearly all focuses on the measurement of product costs to 
decide whether parallel imports would proceed—the control of product quality is not always regarded 
thoroughly.  When the same products with inferior quality through parallel imports are brought into the domestic 
market to compete with the products originally circulated, there would be some negative impact on the 
customers and the manufacturer in the domestic market, even some jeopardy running toward the trademark 
system.  On the one hand, the product difference triggers the confusion of customers about their constant reliance 
on the manufacturer or the trademark of the manufacturer to obtain products with a specific level of quality.  The 
customer confusion can decay the function of the trademark system and makes customers bear extra search costs 
to seek the desired products that might otherwise be obtained according to the reliance on trademark.   In 
addition, the products with inferior quality may imperil the customers in the issues of health and security.115  On 
the other hand, customer confusion is also reflected in the fact that some customers tend to give up the products 
of the manufacturer and divert to seek other alternative products in the market to avoid the high search cost.  In 
this situation, the manufacturer (the trademark owner) would lose some sale revenue due to the parallel imports 
with inferior quality.  Moreover, the products with inferior quality are fatal to the reputation or goodwill of the 
manufacturer.  To sum up, parallel imports under international exhaustion would lead to a potential risk for the 
customers and the manufacturer in the domestic market.  The cost seems difficult to compensate by the benefit 
resulting from the promotion of international exhaustion about free trade. 
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d)  Uncertainty about Product Services after Sales 
Generally speaking, the parallel importer rarely provides the buyer with sale warranties or product services after 
sale.116  Usually, the products through parallel imports are manufactured in foreign counties, and the 
manufacturer and its local authorized licensees do not take the place of foreign agents to provide the buyer with 
any service.  Consequently, the customers would assume the risk of the product defects after sale by themselves.  
Compared with the ordinary sale, parallel imports seem to deprive the customer of the consumer benefits that are 
available under the ordinary sale.  From this perspective, parallel imports are apparently unfavourable for the 
public because they take the core of the transaction security—the protection of consumers—out of the sale.  
Because the international exhaustion policy is helpful for parallel imports, it indirectly brings the consumers into 
the predicament where there is uncertainty about the protection of the transaction security. 
 
e)  Discouraging Incentives for the Intellectual Property Owner about the Invention, Creation and 
Marketing of New Products 
The essence of the exhaustion doctrine is on balancing the conflicting interests between free trade and 
intellectual property rights by giving the right for first marketing of products to the owner of intellectual property 
rights, leaving the later unspecified buyers the future privilege for resale.  When the intellectual property holder 
has conducted the first sale of the products under intellectual property rights, the reward for intellectual property 
rights about marketing is assumed, and the holder never has any chance to control the flow of products by means 
of intellectual property rights.  The exhaustion doctrine seems a reasonable interest division theoretically.  
However, in practice, especially under international exhaustion, the reasonable interest division of the exhaustion 
doctrine would be distorted because the assumption of reward about the first sale could be dysfunctional in some 
situations.  For example, the intellectual property holder marketed its products first in foreign countries where no 
intellectual property rights are available for this kind of products,117 the compulsory license is applied to this 
kind of product,118 or the government enforces the price control measures on this kind of product.119  Under 
anyone among the three above-mentioned situations, it is difficult for the owner of intellectual property rights to 
use intellectual property rights to exploit the reward in the first sale because no intellectual property right exists 
in the countries, or the pricing function of intellectual property rights is broken by the government’s interference.  
From this perspective, not only could the incentives of the intellectual property holder for further development in 
the products be frustrated, but the spirit of the exhaustion doctrine—the interest division—would also crumble, 
supposing that the international exhaustion policy is adopted in the above-mentioned situations to allow 
unlimited parallel imports to enter the domestic market. 
 
f) Supporting Indirectly the Black Market 
The international exhaustion policy opens the passageway for parallel imports.  This means that the parallel 
imports are not only free from the control of intellectual property laws, but also can be exempted from the 
examining and tracing of the Customs in the domestic market.  Under this situation, in order to pursue the 
maximum profits, it is possible for the unworthy importers to mix some illegal copies that violate intellectual 
property law with the genuine products that are subject to a parallel importation plan through a legal parallel 
import.120  In other words, the legal parallel import indirectly paves a channel to cover the smuggling of the illicit 
copies.  Given the fake products by illegal reproduction have a lower price and a higher uncertainty about 
product security and quality than the genuine products through parallel imports, their entering the domestic 
market would threaten seriously the interests of consumers and intellectual property holders.  Perhaps, it is 
controversial to beat the gray market through parallel imports by intellectual property laws.  Nonetheless, it is no 
doubt that the black market replete with illegal copies is the primary target of intellectual property laws.  The  
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international exhaustion policy, besides enhancing free trade, also brings heavy social costs and law enforcement 
costs into the domestic market because it indirectly supports the black market. 
3.3.3 Responses to Arguments 
 
a)  Responses to Arguments for  International Exhaustion 
In respect of arguments supporting the international exhaustion policy, the opponents would possibly rebut the 
position with the following counterarguments.  First, the proponents of international exhaustion think that 
international exhaustion can strength the international competition of products so that the customers in the target 
market can obtain a reasonable price about the products through parallel imports.  However, the competition 
through parallel imports under international exhaustion comes under the intra-brand competition, rather than 
inter-brand competition.121  The intra-brand competition would break down the scheme of price discrimination of 
the intellectual property owner.  Consequently, it may be anticipated that the owner of intellectual property rights 
is compelled to lift the product price in the source market for parallel imports (some developing countries) for 
fear that the lower products will flow into the domestic market (target market).  In the long run, the customers in 
the source market suffer from the increase of product price while the customers in the target market enjoy the 
competitive price.  It is doubtful if the customers eventually can benefit from parallel imports under international 
exhaustion.122 
 
Next, it seems arbitrary to conclude that parallel imports under international exhaustion can prevent the 
market monopoly of the intellectual property owner and reduce the market collusion of authorized distributors 
(licensees).  Under intellectual property laws, intellectual property rights have some extent of exclusive 
monopoly effects that are mainly designed to encourage people to contribute to society by inventing and creating 
new things.  However, the monopoly power of intellectual property rights does not always represent the 
monopoly power in the market.  Even though there is some obscure implication of market monopoly when the 
owner of intellectual property rights takes advantage of the price discrimination scheme to market products, no 
strong evidence directly supports that the scheme leads to market monopoly.123  As a result, it is inappropriate to 
use international exhaustion policy to prevent a market monopoly that is  inevitable in the exercise of intellectual 
property rights.  Moreover, the problem of collusion of the authorized distributors (licensees) against the pricing 
plan, as a matter of fact, is a violation of fiduciary duties.  It is better to solve the problem through the market 
monitoring mechanism and the contact than the intellectual property policy. 
 
Third, the conclusion that the national exhaustion of intellectual property rights constitutes a non-tariff 
barrier under the WTO is based on an incorrect knowledge of the basic spirit of the WTO.  According to this 
view, the promotion of international free trade under the WTO triumphs any other interest.  When parallel 
imports spark the conflict between international free trade and intellectual property rights, it becomes the 
corollary that the international exhaustion policy backing up free trade always surpasses the national exhaustion 
policy protecting intellectual property rights.  Based on this opinion, the national exhaustion policy seems to be 
interpreted as a non-tariff barrier under the WTO.   In fact, both international free trade and intellectual property 
rights share equal positions for interest consideration under the WTO.124  This concept may be observed from the 
TRIPS Agreement enacting to balance the interest of free trade and the protection of intellectual property 
rights.125  From this perspective, Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement—an agreement to disagree—should be 
respected.  Any interpretation attempted to preclude the national exhaustion from the WTO is tantamount to 
emptying the TRIPS Agreement.126 
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Fourth, while parallel imports under international exhaustion open a low-price drug channel to the countries 
where serious epidemic and endemic diseases are prevalent, some worrisome problems are produced in parallel 
imports of medicines—the quality control of medicines and the supply of medicines.  The quality control of 
medicines focuses on whether the quality of medicines conforms to the international safety standard of medicine, 
or whether there are some fake drugs mixed in the genuine ones.  The supply of medicines indicates a suspicion 
about whether the volume of drugs via parallel imports is sufficient to meet the need in the countries that are 
fighting some serious diseases.  The two problems show the possible threat and uncertainty caused by parallel 
imports of medicines under international exhaustion, when parallel imports are used as a means for humanitarian 
salvage.  From this, parallel imports under international exhaustion is not a reliable approach because life saving 
cannot tolerate any uncertainty.  According to some scholars’ suggestion, the donation of drugs or money for 
resisting the serious diseases is a more pragmatic way to achieve the humanitarian goal.127    
 
Fifth, although the international exhaustion policy is conducive to the export trades of the developing 
countries via parallel imports, it merely stimulates the export economy in the developing countries in a limited 
way.  The exports via parallel imports under international exhaustion cannot completely account for the 
economic development in the developing countries because these products for parallel imports are usually 
developed by the industries of the developed countries.  Even though the products are manufactured or 
assembled in the developing countries, they are put into the market for sale under the brand of the industries of 
the developed countries.  The effective way to promote the export-oriented economy in the developing countries 
is to assist these countries in developing their own products and industry brands by technology transfer and 
transnational cooperation.  It is evident that parallel imports under international exhaustion cannot help the 
developing countries create their own industry brands. 
 
Finally, the prevention of misuse of intellectual property rights and the promotion of the international 
exhaustion policy are two separate and independent issues.  To mitigate some misuses is merely an incidental 
effect in the adoption of the international exhaustion policy.  Consequently, an incidental effect is actually not 
enough to justify the use of the international exhaustion policy in the cases of parallel imports.  The cost that the 
international exhaustion possibly would bring about would surpass the benefit of curing the misuse of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
b) Responses to Arguments against International Exhaustion 
Some specious defects exist in the arguments against the international exhaustion policy that are worth 
scrutinizing.  Regarding the price discrimination scheme, the opponents of international exhaustion believe that 
the scheme can provide the developing countries with affordable price for products and continuous product 
supplies.  Under this opinion, the international exhaustion of intellectual property rights would destroy the 
mechanism of price discrimination so that the owner of intellectual property rights could be enforced to raise the 
product price or quit from the markets in the developing countries with a view to avoiding parallel imports.  As a 
matter of fact, the mechanism mentioned above is merely established on a hypothesis that the manufacturer 
would execute the scheme according to the rational judgment.  However, it is found that the actual practice of the 
scheme is not always consistent with the rational expectation.  There are some occasions where the product price 
in the developing countries is higher than that in the developed ones.128  That implicates the possibility that some 
manipulation is interfering with the operation of the price discrimination scheme according to specific business 
consideration rather than the rational judgment.  Since the scheme is vulnerable to the artificial manipulation, the 
expected function of adjusting the price and supply in the developing countries becomes unreliable. 
 
Second, the argument that the international exhaustion policy would encourage the commercial arbitrage via 
parallel imports is fragile and superficial.  Under a thorough observation, the actual cause invoking the 
commercial arbitrage is either the change of the global economy or the price discrimination scheme of industries  
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about products.  The change of the global economy usually works on the exchange rate of currencies to attract 
the arbitrage acts via parallel imports—for example the currency appreciation occurs in one country, but the 
product price in this country is not adjusted to meet the appreciation yet.  Moreover, the pricing under the price 
discrimination scheme is also an important incentive for the arbitrage via parallel imports.  From this, it is 
impossible for the parallel importer to conduct the arbitrage, provided that there is no or little price difference in 
the global markets, even if the international exhaustion policy is adopted. 
 
Next, free riding is a serious problem in the cases of parallel imports.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
free riding is a necessary element or characteristic of parallel imports.  It is difficult to prove that the price 
difference of parallel imports comes from the free riding.129  In view of globally marketing, the parallel importer 
has contributed to the administration and promotion cost of the products because the price by which it purchased 
source products in the foreign market is inclusive of allocated operating and advertisement expenditures for the 
products.  Consequently, using the free riding to frustrate the justification of parallel imports under international 
exhaustion is unpersuasive.  Additionally, the passing off of intellectual property rights, in particular trademark, 
seriously threatens the protection of customers and the intellectual property owner, as well as the intellectual 
property systems.  Granting that it is possible for the parallel importer to bring the products with inferior quality 
to the domestic market under international exhaustion, there is no evidence that most cases of passing off are 
from parallel imports.  From this, the passing off of parallel imports should be given the same treatment under 
law as that of other situations.  In other words, parallel imports need not be overemphasized in the cases of 
passing off.  Any product with inferior quality that possibly causes the likelihood of confusion would be 
examined by intellectual property right law or other related laws, even though the product can enter the domestic 
market via parallel imports under the international exhaustion policy.  Because the international exhaustion 
policy never exempts the passing off situations from intellectual property law, there is no strong reason to assert 
that it aggravates passing off in the domestic market. 
 
The fourth counter argument against the opponents of international concerns the product warranty and the 
services after sale.  It is theoretically known that the products through parallel imports usually are not associated 
with the product warranty and the services after sale.  However, it is not always the case in the real practice of 
parallel imports.  There are two factors driving the parallel importer to provide the product warranty and the 
services after sales.  One is market competition.  As the consciousness of consumers is raised, the product 
warranty and the services after sale have become the critical consideration of consumers in choosing products for 
purchasing.   Under the pressure of competition, the parallel importer would be bound to cover competitive 
warranty and service conditions to maintain its product advantages.  Another factor is sale law.  According to 
sale law, the implied warranty of sales is not precluded in advance.130  In other words, the parallel importer 
would be responsible for the legal warranty of sales under law, provided that the parallel importer is as a seller 
under law. 
 
Regarding the argument that the incentives of the intellectual property owners are discouraged by the parallel 
imports under international exhaustion coming from countries where no patent protection exists for products, the 
conclusion ignores a fact that this situation is not inevitable.  That is, when planning the global market, the 
owner of intellectual property rights has a chance to survey the protection of intellectual property rights about the 
products for marketing in any possible market, evaluate all benefits and costs resulting from marketing in any 
country, and make up a final decision about what countries are suitable for markets to the industry’s best interest.  
As a result, the disadvantage in the parallel imports coming from countries without patent protection can be 
avoided in advance through the market evaluation of the owner of intellectual property rights.  Any choice to 
market in the countries without patent protection by free volition and commercial judgment should not be a 
reason to object to parallel imports under international exhaustion.131 
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Finally, the problem of the black market under intellectual property laws—the prohibition of the illegal 
reproduction— is set as a prioritized goal to achieve because the existence of the black market directly shakes 
the foundation of intellectual property rights.   Relatively, the problem of the gray market or parallel imports has 
broader room to deal with—the prohibition of parallel imports depends upon what exhaustion policy is applied—
because the two interests of free trade and intellectual property rights would be considered jointly.  For this 
perspective, the problem of the black market and that of the gray market should be treated differently under 
intellectual property laws.  It is an inappropriate approach to use intellectual property laws to prohibit the gray 
market overall in order to prevent the invasion of the black market.  To adopt the national exhaustion policy with 
a view to avoiding the illegal copies of products entering into market via parallel imports under international 
exhaustion is a concrete showing of treating the problem of the gray market in the same way with that of the 
black market.      
 
3.4 Economic Arguments:  International Exhaustion in Terms of Parallel Imports 
3.4.1 Economic arguments for International Exhaustion in Terms of Parallel Imports 
 
a)  Comparative Advantage Theory 
 
Generally speaking, the economic arguments for the international exhaustion policy are based on the theory of 
comparative advantage in international trade.132  Since parallel imports under international exhaustion have a 
price advantage over same products in the local market, they could be conducive to opening free trades 
efficiently.133  However, some scholars argued against this position by thinking that the pricing of products 
protected by intellectual property rights should be rested on the owner of intellectual property rights, rather other 
the market.134  From this perspective, it seems that comparative advantage theory should be revisited to 
determine whether it may be applicable in the cases of parallel imports under the international exhaustion policy.    
 
b)  Customer Surplus and Wealth Redistribution 
Since the adoption of the international exhaustion policy would result in some impacts in national economy 
through parallel imports, it is necessary to make a cost-benefit analysis about the changes of policy to measure 
the national welfare.135  As far as importing countries are concerned, parallel imports bring much consumer 
surplus because the price in the importing country about the same product has fallen.136  Relatively, from the side 
of the firms and workers producing the same products in the importing countries, the loss would occur when the 
demand for the original products has decreased.137  The focus is shifted toward the exporting countries.  In the 
export countries, the customers suffer a loss in the price, given that the increase of exports via parallel imports 
would decrease the supply of the products, and the product price would be compelled to increase.138  However, 
the positive effects, in contrast, come to the firms and workers in the exporting countries.139  In other words, the 
firms and workers producing the products enjoy the advantage in increasing the products with a higher price to 
correspond to the increased demand of products due to parallel imports.  After the cost-benefit analysis in both 
importing countries and exporting countries, it is expected to conclude that the net impact on the national welfare  
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under international exhaustion would be positive,140 because the customer gain is higher than the loss to firms in 
the import countries,141 and the customer loss is lower than the gain of firms in the export countries.142 
 
In terms of the global welfare, the international exhaustion policy could have an allocation effect of wealth 
and resources between developed and developing countries.143  It makes the developing countries have a chance 
to access the patented products, and then create their own productive capability through further research and 
development while the patentees in the developed countries never license the products or the manufacturing 
technologies to specific developing countries.  The parallel imports under international exhaustion have 
significant meaning in serving a substitute of the transfer of technologies.  Consequently, the effects of wealth 
redistribution would be reflected in the global welfare.    
3.4.2 Arguments against International Exhaustion in Terms of Parallel Imports 
 
a)  International Price Discrimination  
In economic analysis of the international exhaustion policy, the analysis of the free-riding phenomenon of 
parallel imports and that of the international price discrimination scheme of the intellectual property holder are 
two important aspects.  The negative impact of the free-riding phenomenon of parallel imports is well known.144  
Nevertheless, since the free-riding phenomenon is not easy to detect and prove in the issue of parallel import, its 
strong position against the international exhaustion policy is shaken.145  Compared with the free-riding 
phenomenon, the price discrimination may be observed from the pricing structure in the global markets.  As a 
result, the economic analysis of the international price discrimination becomes important in objecting to the 
international exhaustion policy.  The stronger the extent of justification of the international price discrimination 
is, the weaker stand the international exhaustion policy would take.  Certainly, there are some predicaments in 
the economic analysis of the international price discrimination because the price difference in all national 
markets does not always originate from the price discrimination scheme—the price difference can be caused by 
the changes of the exchange between currencies or the government’s intervention.146  If that is the case, the 
justified effects of the economic analysis of the international price discrimination would be influenced. 147   
 
b)  The National Welfare and The Global Welfare 
In respect of the national welfare of international price discrimination, if parallel imports are prohibited, the 
countries with more demand elasticity to price—developing countries—enjoy the gain by which the markets in  
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the countries continue serving the products with a lower price.148  However, the countries with less demand 
elasticity to price—rich industrialized countries—would suffer a loss because they are charged with a high price 
for the product under the price discrimination scheme which would be otherwise lower under the price uniform 
scheme or the situations where parallel imports are allowed.149   
 
As to the analysis of the global welfare, the net effects through comparing the gain in the countries of high 
demand elasticity with the loss in the ones of low demand elasticity must be determined.  The effect, as a matter 
of fact, is obscure.  In other words, it needs to be measured by considering other external factors.  Usually, the 
continuous expansion of the production in the countries with high demand elasticity would compensate the loss 
in the ones with low demand elasticity.150   Moreover, according to the research of economists, the global 
welfare of the international price discrimination varies with the extent of demand dispersion in countries.151  The 
larger the demand dispersion is found between countries, the more global welfare the international price 
discrimination would produce.152  In addition, the markets with significant competition enhance the global 
welfare of the international price discrimination.153  It also implicates that the low level of market power held by 
the owner of intellectual property rights is conducive to the welfare extent.154  Another point that needs to be 
emphasized is that the volitional price discrimination would produce more global welfare than the planned one 
conducted according to the government regulation.155 
 
Finally, in order to make the global welfare under international price discrimination go further, it is 
suggested that the price discrimination should be established among the groups of counties where all member 
states have close per capita income, and parallel imports can be allowed within each group due to the low 
transaction cost.156 
4.  Overall Examination and Evaluation of and the Exhaustion Doctrine and Parallel Imports in 
Terms of Globally Harmonized Perspective—Establishing the Globally Optimal Legal 
Model for Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights 
4.1. Whether International Exhaustion Should Be Adopted 
4.1.1 Conclusion from Policy Argument 
Under the arguments of Chapter three against the international exhaustion of intellectual property rights, it might 
be found that the opponents of international exhaustion are mainly concerned with the economic disadvantage 
and the unfair competition caused by international exhaustion.157  The economic disadvantage is reflected in the 
cheaper price of the product protected under intellectual property rights led by international exhaustion through 
parallel importation.  According to the arguments against international exhaustion, the advantageous price would 
not only undermine the price discrimination mechanism built by intellectual property owners for international  
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marketing, but also frustrate the incentive of the intellectual property owners to develop new inventions, 
commercial products and creations.  On unfair competition, the arguments against international exhaustion focus 
on the problems of free riding and passing off with the possible attribution to international exhaustion through 
parallel importation.  
 
In this author’s opinion, the concerns mentioned above of the opponents of international exhaustion have 
been built on some misconceptions about intellectual property system.   The misconceptions come from ignoring 
the reward through first sale for intellectual property owners and equating the adequate award of intellectual 
property owners with the commercial success.  
 
Although the actual reward for the intellectual property owners under intellectual property system has been 
difficult to be calculated by a uniform model, the sale revenue of the products protected by intellectual property 
rights for the first marketing, at least, should be considered the reward in terms of the distribution of the 
protected products.  Regardless of the common law system or continental system, intellectual property laws all 
tend to release the exclusive right of intellectual property owners over the future distribution of the protected 
products after the first sale of the products has been made in the markets, even though it is still under dispute 
whether the exclusive right over distribution remains to be against parallel importation from the foreign markets.  
In terms of legal evaluation under intellectual property laws, to secure the legal entitlement of intellectual 
property rights to seek the sale revenue of the protected products for the first marketing is the price of giving 
away the future interference about the distribution of the products.   As a result, unless the alternative approach 
will be developed in the future to calculate the actual reward for intellectual property owner to balance the 
abandoning exclusive right over distribution, the access to the sale revenue is the only indicator about whether 
intellectual property owners have generated the reward for distribution of the protected products.   The reward, 
under intellectual property laws, justifies the concession of the exclusive right over the future distribution of the 
protected products after the first marketing.   In other words, the intellectual property owners never lose the 
future control over the distribution of the protected products after the first marketing, provided that the position 
to access the sale revenue of the protected products has been impeded.  On the contrary, the accessing of 
intellectual property owners to the sale revenue of the protected products will lead to the assumption under law 
that the adequate reward about distribution of the protected products has been obtained. 
 
The reward from the first sale of the protected products, depending upon the access to the sale revenue, 
should not be influenced by the geographical scope of the first marketing.  As long as the intellectual property 
owners can directly or indirectly access the sale revenue of the first marketing—the first marketing was 
conducted either by the intellectual property owners or the distributors through the licensing or other related 
agreements—the reward under intellectual property law would be assumed.  From this perspective, when the  
 
reward has been assumed by intellectual property laws, the incentive of intellectual property owner about 
inventing, marketing and creating is also simultaneously considered satisfied under law.  It must be clarified that 
the incentive mentioned by the opponents of international exhaustion that would be damaged by parallel 
importation is not protected by intellectual property laws.  Instead of the necessary reward for the first 
marketing, the incentive argued is connected with the commercial success—maintaining the price discrimination 
scheme.  Nonetheless, the legislative purpose of intellectual property laws is to promote the scientific or cultural 
development and the fair competition in the market by granting the necessary reward, not by guaranteeing the 
commercial success.   Evidently, it cannot be justified under law to take advantage of intellectual property laws 
to block parallel importation of the protected products through opposing international exhaustion merely for the 
sake of securing the commercial success on the price discrimination scheme.   Furthermore, even though 
international exhaustion can be opposed to prevent the parallel imports of the protected products under 
intellectual property laws, it does not mean that the commercial success of the price discrimination scheme 
would be assured.  In addition to the possible challenge from competition law, the management and discipline of 
the international marketing network and the strategy of the competitors also play significant roles in deciding the 
maintenance of the advantageous price discrimination scheme.  In view of the uncertain factors out of 
intellectual property laws influencing the commercial success of the price discrimination scheme, it seems an  
 
 JICLT 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology    
Vol. 7, Issue 3 (2012) 
206 
 
 
 
abrupt policy decision to disallow international exhaustion under intellectual property laws to prevent parallel 
importation. 
 
The concerns about fair competition caused by free riding and passing off are also examples of 
misconceiving that the protection of commercial success is under intellectual property laws.   From the angle of 
the international marketing, the promotion acts for the products are involved within the international market 
network, though there is some discrepancy existing in the contents of advertisement to meet specific economic 
and cultural circumstances in each country.  When the parallel importer has the protected products by paying the 
sale price in the foreign country, the price has contained the related cost about the promotion acts of the product 
in this country.  Moreover, the lower price of the protected products under parallel importation is the necessary 
result of the price discrimination scheme.  In terms of contribution to the promotion of the protected products in 
the international market network and pricing the products of parallel importation according to the price 
discrimination scheme, it is hard to think that the parallel importer was free riding on the promotion cost and 
held any unfair advantage in entering the domestic market.  Although it is admitted that the absence of product 
service and warranty after sale in the products under parallel importation would enhance the price advantage in 
the domestic market, the price is not the only factor for the prudent consumer to decide whether the products in 
the gray market are worth purchasing, especially since, nowadays, the image of the products in the gray market 
connected to the lack of the product service has been well established in the minds of the consumers due to the 
rapid spread of commercial information.  After comprehending the benefit from the lower price and the cost 
from the lack of the product service, it is unclear to know whether the products of parallel importation would 
prevail in the market by the price advantage.  As a result, it is far-fetched to resort to intellectual property laws to 
prevent parallel importation for the reason of free-riding. 
 
The concern of passing off is mainly reflected in the cases of the protected products with inferior quality 
through parallel importation.  The protected products under parallel importation were basically manufactured 
according to the authorization of intellectual property owners.  Unless the parallel importer altered the protected 
products without the consent of intellectual property owners before entering the domestic market, any defect or 
inferior quality of the protected products should be attributable to intellectual property owners, other than 
parallel importers.  Consequently, based on the reason that intellectual property owners must bear all 
disadvantages resulting from the incomplete process of manufacture and quality management, the genuine 
protected products under parallel importation would not produce any extra unfair competition against intellectual 
property owners, even though the likelihood of confusion or the damage on goodwill is not avoidable.  
Intellectual property laws are not designed to mitigate the risk that intellectual property owners would bear due 
to the flawed or intended manufacture process, given the elimination of the risk to safeguard the interest of 
intellectual property owners is merely a kind of commercial success, not relevant to the necessary reward 
protected under intellectual property laws.  Consequently, it is unreasonable to prevent the passing off under 
parallel importation by denying international exhaustion under intellectual property laws. 
 
Relying upon the positive arguments for international exhaustion under Chapter three and finding 
unconvincing the concerns of the opponents objecting to international exhaustions, this article, in terms of policy 
consideration, concludes that the international exhaustion doctrine is the optimal legal model to balance the 
interests existing in intellectual property rights and international free trade. 
4.1.2 Conclusion from Economic Argument 
The main economic argument asserted by the opponents of international exhaustion under Chapter three is the 
focus on the positive welfare effect of the price discrimination scheme.158   As a matter of fact, apart from 
arguing that the price discrimination adopted by intellectual property owners is not usually perfect  
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discrimination, not always, as a result, holding higher welfare effect than the uniform pricing system, the 
fundamental phenomenon should be disclosed that the theoretical effect of the price discrimination cannot be 
reflected in the commercial practical  operation.   From the angle of the empirical observation, it is often found 
that the poor or developing countries where the people have lower consumption capability and strong product 
demand are charged higher prices for the protected products than the rich or developed countries, especially 
about medication to fight prevailing epidemics.  This phenomenon has been contradicting the theoretical design 
of the price discrimination scheme that intends to achieve the goal of international marketing by compensating 
the possible loss from marketing in the countries charged lower price with the gain from marketing in the 
countries charged higher price.  The original welfare effect built upon the balance between the interest of 
intellectual property owners and the access to the protected products would be also broken down as the 
incomplete operation of the price discrimination scheme.  As a result, in terms of the current practice of 
international trade, it is highly doubtful whether the anticipated welfare effect of the price discrimination scheme 
would be made. 
 
Additionally, it might be also observed that the manipulation for commercial success has invaded the 
operation of the price discrimination scheme.    Not only would intellectual property owners hold the surplus by 
charging the high price in the developed countries, but they also would establish the market monopoly by 
charging unaffordable prices to people with the tendency of the price sensitivity in the developing countries.  If 
intellectual property laws support the theoretical welfare effect of the price discrimination to oppose 
international exhaustion, ignoring the actual manipulation in the commercial practice, it would make no 
difference to endorse the commercial success of intellectual property owners.  Under this policy, all cost caused 
by the failure of intellectual property laws to balance the interests between intellectual property owners and the 
public—the excessive price over what is needed for incentive is charged in the developed countries, and the 
access of new products is blocked in the developing countries—is certain to be borne by the consumers in the 
international markets. 
 
The transaction cost is also a concern for the opponents of international exhaustion.  The different economic 
development in the global community would raise the transaction cost for adopting the international exhaustion 
doctrine.  It is recommended in terms of economic analysis that the international exhaustion doctrine would 
achieve the highest welfare effect by being applied in the customs union or trade area where the member 
countries have similar economic conditions.  However, from the observation of this author, the transaction cost 
for international exhaustion has been gradually reduced since the WTO was established.  Given that the issue of 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is related to international trade and intellectual property laws, the 
relevant trade agreements and the TRIPS agreement play a decisive role in reducing the transaction cost for 
international exhaustion.  While the trade agreements under the WTO function to eliminate the trade barriers and 
produce the adequate circumstances for international free trade, the TRIPS agreement is engaged in harmonizing 
national intellectual property laws to secure the necessary reward to stimulate the incentive for intellectual 
property owners in the global community.  Therefore, the argument against international exhaustion based on the 
high transaction cost seems to get weakened when considering the contributions of the WTO in international free 
trade. 
 
Finally, it is well established that the free-riding acts conducted by the importer would damage the welfare 
effect of international exhaustion.  Nevertheless, the free riding act is difficult to prove, often serving as an 
argument against international exhaustion for the purpose of commercial success, rather than the adequate 
reward of intellectual property owners.  Through acknowledging the current circumstances for international 
trade, it might be found that the benefit brought by the international exhaustion doctrine is definite, but the cost 
of the free riding acts is unclear.  As a result, it is unreasonable to object to international exhaustion by 
considering the uncertain cost of the free riding acts and ignoring the free competition effect of the international 
exhaustion doctrine. 
 
On account of the arguments of comparative advantage and wealth redistribution in Chapter three and what 
is mentioned about clarifying the concerns of the opponents about the international exhaustion doctrine, this  
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article, in terms of economic analysis, concludes that the international exhaustion doctrine is the optimal legal 
model to balance the interests existing in intellectual property rights and international free trade. 
4.2 How International Exhaustion Should Be Applied 
4.2.1 International Exhaustion and Subject Matters of Intellectual Property  
A core inquiry made about the application of the international exhaustion doctrine is whether the international 
exhaustion doctrine should be applied overall and indiscriminately, or differently according to the attribute of 
each intellectual property rights.  This author thinks that the overall and indiscriminate application of the 
international exhaustion doctrine is the best consideration to work the function of the international exhaustion 
doctrine under intellectual property rights.159  There are three main reasons to support the opinion of this author.  
The first reason is that there has been no sufficient evidence indicating the connection of the different attribute of 
intellectual property rights with the application of the international exhaustion doctrine.  To take patent for 
example, even though the higher R&D and maintenance cost must be involved in the application of patent, it is 
not necessarily inferred that the opposition of the international exhaustion doctrine would secure the incentive of 
the patentee for the future inventions.  As mentioned above under the conclusion from the policy argument, the 
concern about the application of the international exhaustion doctrine to undermine the incentive of the patentee 
is built upon the commercial success that is not the goal of intellectual property laws.  As matter of fact, the 
commercial success resulting from avoiding the advantageous price of parallel importation under the national 
exhaustion doctrine is not invulnerable to the price competition of other legal similar products and other market 
changes.  It is unconvincing to argue that the incentive of the patentee for future inventions would be protected 
by prohibiting the application of the international exhaustion doctrine under patent law. 
 
The second reason focuses on the necessary reward for intellectual property owners’ inventions, new 
products or creative works under intellectual property laws.  As mentioned about under the conclusion for the 
policy argument, the access of intellectual property owners to the sale revenue of the protected products for the 
first marketing, regardless of whether the sale market is domestic or foreign, is assumed under intellectual 
property laws as necessary reward for the intellectual property owners to give up the control over the future 
distribution of the protected products. The incentives of intellectual property owners have been considered 
satisfied under intellectual property laws, when the intellectual property owners are granted the necessary 
reward.  From this perspective, instead of the respective attribute of intellectual property rights, the necessary 
reward under intellectual property laws influences the incentives of intellectual property owners in the future 
inventions, new products, or creative works.  It is evident that it is not necessary to allow the adoption of the 
national exhaustion doctrine to specific intellectual property right to secure the incentives of intellectual property 
owners. 
 
The most significant reason for this author to oppose the discriminating application of the international 
exhaustion according to the different attributes of intellectual property rights is rested upon the prevention of 
misuse of intellectual property rights.  Nowadays, according to the development of modern technologies and the 
need of the consumers, the products tend to be complex and delicate.  It is possible for a product to be embodied 
with varied intellectual property rights—for example, a product is simultaneously protected under patent law, 
trademark law and copyright law, or a patented and trademarked product has an attached copyrighted label or 
package.  When both the international exhaustion doctrine and the national exhaustion doctrine are applied under 
law according to the different attributes of intellectual property rights, the misuse of intellectual property rights 
would happen as a result of manipulating nominally one unexhausted intellectual property right to stop the 
parallel importation for the real purpose of enforcing the exhausted right, provided the products under parallel 
importation are embodied with varied intellectual property rights—while some rights are exhausted according to 
the international exhaustion doctrine, others remain unexhausted under the national exhaustion doctrine.  The  
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result would damage the legislative purpose of the international exhaustion doctrine balancing the interest of 
intellectual property owners and the access of the public to the protected products in the specific intellectual 
property right, and also would make intellectual property laws tend substantially to adopt the national exhaustion 
doctrine.  Another cost in this misuse is reflected in the unfair competitive benefit in the domestic market from 
avoiding parallel importation by using the unexhausted right to resurrect the exhausted right under intellectual 
property laws, even though the intellectual property owner has received the adequate reward to abandon the 
exhausted right.   
4.2.2 International Exhaustion and Types of Parallel Importation 
Compared with the importation of the counterfeit products, the parallel importation is made to carry the lawful 
genuine products that were manufactured with the authorization of intellectual property owners.  Generally, the 
parallel importation has varied types according to the factors of the patterns of the authorization and 
manufacture, the manufacture place and the relation of the importer with the manufacturer.  Since the application 
of the international exhaustion doctrine concerns the consent of the intellectual property owner about the first 
marketing of the protected products in the foreign market, and the access to the sale revenue for first revenue 
marketing as the reward in exchange for giving up the future distribution right, each type of parallel importation 
must be examined under intellectual property laws prior to the application.  From this perspective, the types of 
parallel importation would not directly influence the application of the international exhaustion doctrine.160  As 
long as the consent of the intellectual property owner for the first marketing in the foreign market could be 
found, any type of parallel importation would be protected under the international exhaustion doctrine from the 
further interference of the exclusive distribution right.   
 
However, U.S. copyright law tends to distinguish the parallel importation of the protected products made in 
the U.S. from that of the protected products made outside the U.S. under the application of the international 
exhaustion doctrine.  It might be inferred from Quality King of the U.S. Supreme Court that the latter could be 
excluded from the application of the international exhaustion doctrine.  The conclusion, as mentioned above 
under the overall observation of legal system, is not beyond criticism.  The manufacture place is not connected 
with the determination of the necessary reward for intellectual property owners to abandon the exclusive right 
over the future distribution of the protected products.  In addition, the real purpose of adding the condition of 
manufacture in the U.S. to the application of the international exhaustion doctrine is suspected to point to the 
protection of the local employment and manufacture economy.  Intellectual property laws obviously cannot 
endorse this purpose. 
4.2.3. International Exhaustion and Types of Goods Embodied with Intellectual Property 
It is significant to clarify whether the international exhaustion doctrine shall be applied to all kinds of goods, or 
limited to specific goods.  If the concern is put about what goods under the adoption of the international 
exhaustion doctrine can produce the best welfare effects, and what goods cannot, it is necessary to conduct the 
international good survey under parallel importation completely and thoroughly.  Although there have been some 
national governments and scholars engaged in the empirical studies of parallel importation of goods, these 
surveys are confined to specific geographical scope (a state or a customs union) and particular goods that have 
the economic significance in the market.161  The empirical results of these surveys based upon the restricted good  
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 Generally speaking, the empirical studies are often restrained by the territoriality of sampling and the preference of related 
issues.  For example, John C. Hilke chose the research samples within the U.S., and his study is focused on the free-riding 
problem; however, Professors Chard and Mellor established their samples in the U.K., and their study is not limited to 
trademark, reaching out the analysis about prejudice to innovation through parallel imports.  Regarding the comment on the 
two empirical studies, see ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS, supra note 24, at 567-78.  In addition, in terms of the empirical 
studies conducted or entrusted by governments, the particular economic structure and environment of nation or region are 
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data and national or regional economic interest orientation would not be conducive to the decision of the 
internationally harmonized policy about the international exhaustion doctrine.  Owing to the difficulty to find the 
optimal survey and assessment method—how to exhaust the types of goods on data collecting and how to assess 
the global welfare of each type of good—no complete international good survey about the adoption of 
international exhaustion doctrine has been conducted up to now.  The feasibility of the international good survey 
is not sanguine.  In addition, even though the predicament of the method on the international survey is overcome, 
the empirical results could not be guaranteed to be equal to the future changes in the international markets.  It 
can be anticipated that as the international demand and supply of specific goods are changed and new goods are 
developed in the international markets, the global welfare effect of goods under the original international good 
survey about the adoption of the international exhaustion doctrine would be certainly influenced.  From this 
perspective, to seek the discriminating application of the international exhaustion doctrine to different types of 
goods would be involved in high cost on policy decision—the establishment and maintenance cost about the 
international good survey—and would lead to the uncertain policy benefit—the vulnerability of empirical result 
for policy consideration to the future market changes.   
5. Conclusion 
The exhaustion of intellectual property rights is the balance mechanism between the maintenance of international 
free trade and the protection of intellectual property rights.  The spirit of the exhaustion doctrine is reflected in 
granting the intellectual property owners the opportunity to directly or indirectly access the sale revenue of the 
first marketing of the protected products as the price to abandon the exclusive right to control the future 
circulation of the protected products.  Under the law equation, the balance between the public interest and the 
private interest has been assumed under the exhaustion doctrine.  The interest balance mechanism is never 
affected by the geographical scope of the first marketing, as long as the domestic intellectual property owner has 
the opportunity to access the sale revenue for the first marketing as a reward in exchange of exhaustion effect.  
From this perspective, the adoption of the international exhaustion doctrine would leave the interest balance 
mechanism intact.  In addition, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, it is concluded from examining policy 
arguments, economic arguments and legal experience that the international exhaustion doctrine is the optimal 
legal model on the exhaustion issue for the global community.  Since the international exhaustion doctrine is 
built upon the basis of the interest balance, according to the best interest for the global community, it is strongly 
justified to position this doctrine as a globally harmonized legal model in the global community. 
Besides the advantageous characteristics of the international exhaustion doctrine, there are two main reasons 
to promote the establishment of the globally harmonized legal model for the exhaustion issue.162  One reason is 
to avoid the manipulation on the exhaustion issue through the international trade negotiations.  On the surface, 
without the globally harmonized legal model, it seems that each country in the global community may adopt the 
exhaustion doctrine best meeting the demands of the national economic development.  However, it can be 
anticipated that the developed countries with stronger economic bargain power would force those developing 
countries to change their interest consideration to follow the exhaustion doctrine of the developed countries 
through bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations.163  Under this situation, not only would the absolute national 
discretion on the decision of the exhaustion doctrine be destroyed, but the interest balance mechanism under the 
exhaustion doctrine would also be jeopardized, given that the compulsory adoption of the national exhaustion 
doctrine would make the domestic intellectual property owner enjoy double reward for the exhaustion effect— 
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one from the first marketing in the foreign country and another from importation to the domestic market.  In this 
author’s opinion, the globally harmonized legal model for the exhaustion issue can prevent this defect. 
 
Another reason for the establishment of the globally harmonized legal model for the exhaustion issue is 
rested upon the justification of determining the adequate protection scope of intellectual property rights.  It is 
undeniable that the absence of the globally harmonized legal model for the exhaustion issue provides each 
country in the global community with the policy flexibility on the decision of the exhaustion doctrine by 
considering the national political, economic, and social developments.  However, in this author’s opinion, this 
flexibility also blurs the boundary for the protection of intellectual property rights. In other words, the decision 
of the exhaustion doctrine is vulnerable to the interest considerations beyond intellectual property laws that 
would break down the interest balance mechanism under the exhaustion doctrine—for example, the adoption of 
the national exhaustion doctrine is with the aim of securing the commercial success, or the local industries.  
These policy purposes out of intellectual property laws should be fulfilled by other legislation or administrative 
means, rather than the exhaustion doctrine.  The application of the exhaustion doctrine produced beyond the 
consideration of intellectual property laws would distort the real function of the exhaustion doctrine, increasing 
unnecessary social costs.  Consequently, this author thinks that the establishment of the globally harmonized 
legal model for the exhaustion doctrine would be conducive to assuring the adoption of the exhaustion doctrine 
within the gist of intellectual property laws. 
 
After the necessity of the globally harmonized legal model for the exhaustion issue has been determined, the 
next step is concerned with what forum is optimal to endorse and enforce the harmonized legal model.  Since the 
exhaustion issue of intellectual property rights involves the strained balance between the protection of 
intellectual property rights and the maintenance of international free trade, the WTO functioning to promote free 
trade, eliminating the unnecessary barriers and assuaging the impact of intellectual property rights on free trade 
should be the proper international forum to regulate the harmonized exhaustion doctrine.  Currently, although 
Article 6 of the TRIPS under the WTO has tended to give the discretion to the member state to decide the 
adoption of the exhaustion doctrine due to the difficulty in settling the interest conflict among states by a 
uniform exhaustion doctrine, this author believes that the firm justification of the international exhaustion 
doctrine would be amenable to any examination from the member states and eventually would be expected to 
break through the present stalemate to form the harmonized legal model in Article 6 of the TRIPS under the 
WTO164.  Certainly, it is worth noting that the cooperation of the WIPO system with the WTO system is 
indispensable to the establishment of the globally harmonized international exhaustion doctrine in the global 
community.    
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